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Classical risk analysis is a static process that does not account for rapid evolutionary or 
generational changes in technology and technological solutions.  This thesis defines a process that 
expands classical risk analysis to increase visualization of the secuurity environment of an 
information system.  It provides a comparative analysis of system attributes and encourages 
focused communications between decision-makers and information systems technicians.  
Personal interviews with domain experts from four organizations were used to construct a 
baseline model.  Face validity of the model was determined during sessions with the domain 
experts. The model was calibrated to two specific scenarios using a pair of surveys to set link 
values and establish data for the initial nodes. A verification phase compared rough results from 
the model with expert opinion. 
The model evaluated, prioritized and graphically illustrated shortfalls within two 
information systems based on the relative importance of specific criteria established by the 
domain experts.  And, it facilitated the extraction of implicit or tacit knowledge from the domain 
























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................... 1 
A. RISK ANALYSIS ILLUSTRATED ......................................................................... 1 
B. BACKGROUND......................................................................................................... 1 
C. BENEFITS OF THIS THESIS.................................................................................. 2 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW....................................................................................................... 3 
A. INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTER SECURITY AND INFORMATION 
ASSURANCE ............................................................................................................. 3 
1. Information Security..................................................................................... 4 
2. Information Assurance (IA) ......................................................................... 4 
3. Information Systems Security (INFOSEC)................................................. 4 
B. FRAMEWORK FOR MANAGING SECURE SYSTEMS.................................... 5 
1. Enterprise Security Policy ............................................................................ 6 
2. Organizational Security Policy..................................................................... 6 
3. Automated Security Policy ........................................................................... 7 
C. THE SITUATIONAL INFLUENCE ASSESSMENT MODULE (SIAM)............ 7 
1. Influence Nets ................................................................................................ 8 
2. SIAM Explained ............................................................................................ 9 
3. Applying  SIAM........................................................................................... 11 
III. THE MODEL:  ITS DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION........................................ 15 
A. CONCEPT AND CONTEXT.................................................................................. 15 
B. THE MODEL TODAY............................................................................................ 17 
1. Orientation................................................................................................... 17 
a. Installation and Configuration ....................................................... 19 
b. Operations........................................................................................ 20 
c. Administration................................................................................. 22 
C. DATA COLLECTION ............................................................................................ 22 
1. Asking the “Right Questions Right”.......................................................... 22 
2. Questions and Answers............................................................................... 23 
a. Interviews......................................................................................... 23 
b. Surveys............................................................................................. 23 
3. Setting the Values for Links and Nodes .................................................... 23 
D. MODEL CONSTRUCTION AND VALIDATION............................................... 24 
 vii
1. Initial Construction ..................................................................................... 24 
2. Validation..................................................................................................... 24 
3. Calibration ................................................................................................... 25 
4. Verification .................................................................................................. 28 
5. Challenges Presented .................................................................................. 29 
E. ANALYSIS STRATEGY......................................................................................... 29 
IV. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS ..................................................................................................... 31 
A. DOMAIN EXPERTS’ RESPONSE ........................................................................ 31 
1. Methods ........................................................................................................ 31 
2. Findings........................................................................................................ 31 
B. MODEL EXCURSIONS.......................................................................................... 32 
1. Methods ........................................................................................................ 33 
a. Step One:  Establishing Excursion Link Values............................ 33 
b. Step Two:  Populating the Excursion Initial Nodes....................... 33 
c. Step Three:  Conducting a thumbnail analysis .............................. 33 
2. Findings........................................................................................................ 33 
V. BEYOND CLASSICAL RISK ANALYSIS ........................................................................ 35 
A. QUANTITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS..................................................................... 36 
B. QUALITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS........................................................................ 37 
C. MODEL BENEFITS ................................................................................................ 38 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................................. 41 
A. UTILITY OF THE APPLICATION ...................................................................... 41 
1. Comparative Base Lining Relative to Stated Policy and Goals............... 41 
2. Comparison of Current States to Baselines .............................................. 41 
3. Comparison of Alternatives........................................................................ 42 
4. Evaluation of Relative Performance Levels for Internal or External 
Agencies........................................................................................................ 42 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DOD...................................................................... 42 
1. Comparative Base Lining in Support of Certification and 
Accreditation................................................................................................ 42 
2. Performance Base-lining and Comparative Evaluation .......................... 43 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH ............................................................................................ 43 
1. Integration of the Model into the DITSCAP Process............................... 43 
 viii
2. Expansion of the Model to Evaluate SLA Compliance in Support of 
NMCI............................................................................................................ 44 
D. CONCLUSION......................................................................................................... 44 
APPENDIX A. FIREWALLS DESCRIBED ............................................................................. 45 
A. OVERVIEW ............................................................................................................. 45 
1. What is a Firewall? ..................................................................................... 45 
2. Defining an Access Control Policy ............................................................. 46 
a. Default Deny Stance......................................................................... 46 
b. Default Permit Stance....................................................................... 46 
B. FIREWALL EFFECTIVENESS ............................................................................ 46 
1. Capabilities .................................................................................................. 47 
2. Limitations ................................................................................................... 47 
C. DECOMPOSITION OF A TECHNOLOGY CLASS........................................... 48 
1. Packet Filtering Firewalls........................................................................... 48 
2. Application Gateways / Proxy Servers ...................................................... 49 
3. Hybrids......................................................................................................... 50 
APPENDIX B. EXCURSION ONE............................................................................................ 51 
A. MARINE CORPS INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & NETWORK 
OPERATIONS CENTER........................................................................................ 51 
1. Link Value Survey....................................................................................... 51 
2. Node Value Survey for the Marine Corps Information Technology & 
Network Operations Center ....................................................................... 69 
APPENDIX C. EXCURSION TWO........................................................................................... 73 
A. JOINT INFORMATION OPERATIONS CENTER ............................................ 73 
1. Link Value Survey....................................................................................... 73 
2. Node Value Survey ...................................................................................... 91 
LIST OF REFERENCES .................................................................................................................. 95 
A. DOD REFERENCES ............................................................................................... 95 
B. NON-DOD REFERENCES..................................................................................... 95 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 99 























LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 1:  Sample Influence Net Diagram.............................................................................................. 8 
Figure 2:  The SIAM Belief Slider ....................................................................................................... 10 
Figure 3:  The SIAM Link Value Slider Bars ...................................................................................... 11 
Figure 4:  SIAM Impact Analysis Results............................................................................................ 12 
Figure 5:  SIAM Pressure Point Analysis Results ................................................................................ 13 
Figure 6:  Initial Top Level IA Net ...................................................................................................... 17 
Figure 7:  Model Topography............................................................................................................... 18 
Figure 8:  Firewall Root and Associated Parent Nodes........................................................................ 19 
Figure 9:  Installation and Configuration ............................................................................................. 20 
























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
The thesis has given me a reason to go to class for twenty-one of twenty-eight months, 
but the best part of my education at the Naval Postgraduate School has been the opportunity to 
meet and work with all of the people who have helped nurture, cajole, encourage, and drag my 
dim concept of more effectively prioritizing IA expenditures into the light of day. 
I would like to thank the personnel of C4, Headquarters Marine Corps, specifically:  Mrs. 
Debra Filippi, Deputy Director, C4 (CIO); Colonel Robert Baker, Chief, Plans and Policies, C4; 
and Ms. Elaine Cassara, Branch Head, Information Assurance, C4. 
Special thanks must go out to the personnel of the Marine Corps Information Technology 
and Network Operations Center and the Joint Information Operations Center for their 
participation in the modeling process.  Without their forbearance and help, this application would 
have remained in academic limbo.   
The supporting cast includes Dr. Julie Rosen and Wayne Smith, creators of SIAM and 
excellent technical critics for my new application of their software; the NMCI IA team from 
SPAWAR-SD; key IA players at the NSA; and many others.  My deepest thanks to both groups 
and all of the others from DoN CIO, IATFF, NPS, and the commercial sector whose expressed 
interest in the possibilities of a new tool kept me motivated over the months. 
Obviously the support and motivation received from my advisors has been crucial.  
Professor Cynthia Irvine’s knowledge in the field dogged determination to keep me on 
track…Professor Bill Haga’s quiet guidance and steadfast refusal to allow me to ‘wax 
esoteric’…and LCDR Ray Buettner’s strong belief in the validity of the project, his friendship, 
and resource support.  Without the three of them, this thesis would be much less than it has 
become. 
Close friends have also served as excellent sounding boards (willing or unwilling).  
Captain Ann Summers, USA; Captain Holly Korzilius, USMC; Ms. Alexis Waddel, and  MSgt 
Bob Massie, USMC (ret.) have led the way.  I really appreciate your willingness to listen 
patiently as I prattled on. 
Thanks go to my family for providing me with my motivation to succeed.  And, my 
deepest appreciation goes to Ms. Jennifer Dianto.  Her dedication to her own work has kept me 
focused on mine; her professionalism has kept me on track in the final hours; and her deep 























A. RISK ANALYSIS ILLUSTRATED 
Incomplete risk analyses often leaves vulnerabilities in information resource management 
systems and opens organizations up to expensive recoveries after those vulnerabilities have been 
exploited.  Organizational resource allocations are frequently based on the most recently touted 
hack, crack, or chink in the ‘defense-in-depth’ armor.   
Classical risk assessment is time consuming and completely static.  It does not provide a 
collaborative environment that dynamically supports enhanced communications between 
technicians and decision-makers.  “What-if” forecasting in support of changing situations or 
requirements is not easily conducted using either quantitative or classical qualitative techniques. 
Risk analysis is a process undertaken to determine the exposures within a system and 
their potential harm.  The process forces the systematic study of the exposures and assists in 
justifying the type or quantity of security required.  [Pfleeger, 1997]  Although, the purpose of the 
model is to support the justification of security processes or techniques, just as classical risk 
analysis does.  This model does not conduct risk assessments in the classical sense.  Rather, it 
expands on classical methods in order to: 
Enhance visualization of the target system; • 
• 
• 
Provide a dynamic evaluation environment, responsive to rapidly changing 
information assurance requirements; 
And, encourage dialog between decision-makers and technicians through the 
provision of a common frame of reference. 
The model evaluates, prioritizes, and graphically illustrates shortfalls within the modeled 
system based on the relative importance of specific criteria as established by domain experts.  It 
also facilitates the extraction of implicit or tacit knowledge from these same domain experts that 
would not emerge during classical risk analysis.   
B. BACKGROUND 
Intellectually, decision-makers understand the importance of information assurance 
across the enterprise.  However, the resource holders do not really understand the depth of the 
issues, additionally, security costs money.  It is difficult to justify IA expenditures for existing 
systems, when there is no visible threat, let alone allocate resources on IA requirements for 
systems still in the vapor-ware stages.  The result is that decision-makers are pulled into the 
vicious cycle of throwing money at a problem after the problem has already occurred.  We 
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implement, assess, and patch…instead of designing integrated systems and families of systems 
with IA considered from the beginning. 
Technicians suffer from an opposing set of problems.  Although intimately familiar with 
the challenges of operating in the IA world, they are frequently hamstrung by their own 
specialization and consistently suffer from a dearth of resources.  The system almost encourages 
this in that highly skilled specialists are prized…they are selected, trained and rewarded based on 
the depth of their knowledge, not the breadth.  The people that see information systems from a 
big picture stand point do not see systems until AFTER they have been developed.  At that point, 
it is often “…back to the drawing board…”, instituting long delays and significant cost increases. 
A long-run view during the requirements definition phase is critical.  Nevertheless, this 
can have its drawbacks as well.  Decision-makers that take long-term views run the risk of 
becoming locked into strategies designed to solve yesterday’s crisis.  In many cases, this can 
prove to be as detrimental, if not more so, than the expenses associated with treating all problems 
as “one-time” events. 
C. BENEFITS OF THIS THESIS 
The work encompassed in this thesis is a first step in bridging the gap between decision-
makers and technicians.  It provides a process that can be used to evaluate extant firewall systems 
or assist in the strategic allocation of resources towards information assurance.  The model 
developed during this research increases visualization of the environment being modeled; it 
provides a dynamic environment for comparative analysis of system attributes; and, it encourages 
more focused communications between decision-makers and technicians.  This combination of 
characteristics makes it unique.   
Without expansion upon classical risk analysis techniques, organizations will continue to 
invest in emergency situations without thought for incremental benefits.  Solid planning and 
incremental investment, using a tool such as that presented her e, can mitigate the risks of 
throwing good money after bad.  Incremental investments in information assurance have the 
potential to offer exponential increases in security posture.  This thesis offers a process by which 
those incremental investments can be prioritized in relation to organizational security goals. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter will provide the backdrop for further discussion of the central model.  The 
text will introduce some principles of information security and information assurance; define a 
framework for managing secure systems; and detail an overview of the Situational Influence 
Assessment Module (SIAM). 
A. INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTER SECURITY AND INFORMATION 
ASSURANCE 
The National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security 
Instruction, No. 4009, defines computer security as “…measures and controls that ensure 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information systems[IS] assets including hardware, 
software, firmware, and information being processed, stored, and communicated.” [NSTISSI 
4009, 1999]   
Organizations often field software and/or disparate hardware, assess its performance and 
problems, then create or apply patches to fix the discovered bugs and loopholes.  This process 
leaves much to be desired in that it does not allow for the coherent integration of the system at 
large.  Murray states: “We will not achieve effective, much less efficient, security without an 
enterprise-wide design and a coherent management system.”  [in Krause & Tipton, 1999a]  While 
a coherent, integrated approach is a natural process in enterprise network design, system security 
is often left as an after-thought. 
Ranum [1996] asked “What is ‘secure’?”  It appears to be a simple question, but is it 
really?  He went on to propose that “’secure’ by itself doesn’t mean anything.” 
Is secure a meaningful term in the abstract?  The word secure, as it relates to information 
assurance and computer security, is often defined by the result of a technological implementation 
process.  Ergo: suppose that an organization installed a firewall (or access controls, or physical 
security, etc.).  One might suppose that the organization is ‘digitally secure’.  It is possible that 
this measure contributes to overall security; however, without an understanding of how the 
installation of a firewall contributes to the enforcement of enterprise security policy, it is ad hoc.  
Being secure is the result of an iterative, rigorous, development of an information assurance 
policy  and requirements determination.  Without it, security is nothing more than smoke and 
mirrors until requirements are generated in support of an information assurance [IA] strategy. 
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Four basic questions must be asked in order to generate a set of security requirements:   




How hard is an adversary willing to work for unauthorized access or system 
modification? 
What is the loss involved if someone succeeds in gaining unauthorized access?  
How much damage can be done? 
How much is an organization willing to pay to defend or recover its assets?  
(This in terms of how much it will cost in time, money and lost productivity.) 
Although certainly not an exhaustive list, the satisfaction of the requirements generated 
by these questions enables one to begin establishing a reasonable system that balances 
accessibility for authorized users with security from ne’er-do-wells.  Unfortunately, the answers 
to these questions are often along the lines of:  ‘everything’; ‘very hard’; ‘a lot’; and ‘as little as 
they can get away with’.  To paraphrase the industry, security is an inevitable series of tradeoffs:  
security vs. accessibility; functionality vs. ease of use; everything vs. costs.  This thesis will 
attempt to clarify some of the impacts that these tradeoffs may have upon the overall status of a 
system as system security requirements are satisfied.  “The goal,” writes Denning [1999a], “is not 
to deny access – which in itself is a method of attack – but rather to deny only unauthorized 
access and to do so as economically and inconspicuously as possible.” 
1. Information Security  
The Joint Chiefs of Staff defines information security as “…the protection of information 
against unauthorized disclosure, transfer, modification, or destruction, whether accidental or 
intentional.” [JCS, 2001] 
2. Information Assurance (IA) 
DOD has defined Information Assurance as “Information operations that protect and 
defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, 
authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation.  This includes providing for restoration of 
information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities.” [DoDD 
5160.54] 
3. Information Systems Security (INFOSEC) 
According to the National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems 
Security Committee, information systems security is “…the protection of information systems 
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against unauthorized access to or modification of information, whether in storage, processing, or 
transit, and against denial of service to authorized users or the provision of service to 
unauthorized users (including those measures necessary to detect, document, and counter such 
threats).”  [NSTISSI 4009, 1999] 
B. FRAMEWORK FOR MANAGING SECURE SYSTEMS 
In many ways the ability to create a secure, digital nirvana is something of an art form.  It 
involves the focus of a specialist capable of leveraging significant experience, one with an in-
depth knowledge of technology and potential threats, and someone capable of interpreting 
strategic organizational goals into well-defined security requirements.  In order to begin framing 
the challenges involved in the development and implementation of a robust, integrated 
information security solution, a security framework must first be defined.  This framework is 
essential to understanding the critical interactions between policy, planning, and architecture.  For 
our purposes, this framework will be composed of three distinct parts:   
1. The enterprise security policy. 
2. The organizational security policy. 
3. Automated security policies. 
There has been, and continues to be, some debate over what the definition of a “security 
policy” really is.  Sterne [1991] argues several points: 
• That the definition of the term “security policy” is fundamental to computer 
security concepts and terminology. 
• That the lack of a coherent definition acts as an obstacle to routine discourse on 
the subject of computer security. 
• That a clear, concise definition of “security policy” is essential for resolving key 
issues within and establishing the scope of research, systems engineering and 
standardization efforts. 
First, an enterprise cannot develop solid, coherent security architecture that effectively 
supports organizational goals without those goals having been defined in some policy statement.  
If no one understands what security policy is comprised of there is no effective way to 
communicate strategic organizational security goals.  This leads directly into Sterne’s second 
assertion, i.e. how does one have intelligent, meaningful conversation on information assurance 
and computer security for systems supporting an organization if there is no baseline definition of 
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what policy is?  In the end, clearly defined organizational goals allow people to address concerns 
and issues in terms of specific solutions. 
For the purpose of this thesis, the following definitions will apply: 
1. Enterprise Security Policy 
The enterprise security policy is the foundation document, or collection of documents, in 
the information security framework.  At its highest level, this policy will define enterprise goals 
and strategy as they relate to information assurance.  However, subordinate elements may have 
similar framework foundations built on a smaller scale. 
This document represents a strategic view of information assurance and security within 
the enterprise or organization.  In general, it should state big-picture beliefs, goals, and objectives 
of the organization as well as the general means that will be used to attain them.  As with 
commanders’ intent and mission-based orders in the military, an enterprise security policy 
provides guidance and direction to subordinate elements concerning what should be done without 
discussing technical implementations. 
The enterprise security policy contains key elements that define the long-range goals of 
the organization.  Sterne [1991] defines these goals, called Security Policy Objectives, as 
“…statement[s] of intent to protect an identified resource from unauthorized use.”  A stipulation 
of this definition is that an objective is “…meaningful to an organization only if the organization 
owns or controls the resource to be protected.”   
Understanding the limits of one’s influence in the network-centric world, and therefore 
the boundaries of one’s enclave is crucial.  Establishing a measure of ‘reasonable internal and 
external security’ is essential.  However, If an organization does not own a specific asset, service, 
or communications node required to support communications there are only two choices that can 
be made:  either refuse to connect to the external world; or establish a trust relationship with those 
who do own the asset, service or node in question.  These trust relationships comprise an ever-
expanding web that exceeds the scope of this thesis. 
2. Organizational Security Policy 
Sterne [1991] specifies the organizational security policy as: “…the set of laws, rules, 
and practices that regulate how an organization manages, protects, and distributes resources to 
achieve specified security policy objectives.”  In other words, the organizational security policy is 
an abstract; a statement of what the enterprise intends to do.  The organizational security policy 
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should frame how the goals and objectives put forth in the enterprise policy will manifest 
themselves in the automated security policies. 
3. Automated Security Policy 
This refers to an actual implementation policy on a given piece of hardware or in a 
software application.  These are the methods used by software and devices to execute information 
assurance through out the system.  These technical policies are central to the creation of an 
architectural framework, implemented automatically by hardware or software, and govern the 
day-to-day operations of the assembled systems.  Sterne [1991] defines these types of policy as 
“…the set of restrictions and properties that specify how a computing system prevents 
information and computing resources from being used to violate an organizational security 
policy.”  Modern examples of these policies might be automatically executed intrusion detection 
and logging, automated controls within boundary layer security devices, or identification and 
authorization routines enacted by an operating system during network log-ins.   
C. THE SITUATIONAL INFLUENCE ASSESSMENT MODULE (SIAM) 
Created in the early nineties by Rosen and Smith [1994] of Science Applications 
International Corporation, SIAM is a software application that enhances the visualization of 
influences exercised by dissimilar attributes upon a central premise through the use of “influence 
net” technology.  The use of the influence net modeling technique significantly improves the 
capability of the modeler to portray complex inter-relationships in an imperfect and uncertain 
world.  SIAM simplifies the modeling process through the use of an intuitive graphical interface, 
robust analysis tools, and extensive documentation capabilities. 
Complex problems are often solved in group environments where the experience of 
multiple subject matter experts may be leveraged.  Two sets of techniques frequently used are:  
“Seminars, workshops, and informal communications that are aimed at extracting subjective, but 
valid, knowledge from subject matter experts; and mathematical and computer-based 
models/simulations that attempt to estimate current and future states of “physics based” 
phenomena.” [Rosen and Smith, 1996]  In both cases, the underlying reasoning and 
documentation that supported a specific course of action is often lost. 
SIAM offers a structured approach to these discussions that supports real-time 
collaboration among subject-matter experts and, if the process is properly executed, retains the 
source material, justifications, and reasoning that directly impacts a decision set.  “The success of 
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this structured approach lies in the early identification of events and interrelationships that have 
great potential to influence the ultimate outcome of a situation.” [Rosen and Smith, 1999] 
1. Influence Nets 
Influence nodes and links comprise the topology of an influence net that may be used to 
facilitate communications between a group of ‘experts’ and a decision-maker or set of decision-
makers.  Nodes are color coded from red (inhibiting) to blue (promoting) in order to visually 
orient users to value identification. 
 
Figure 1:  Sample Influence Net Diagram 
The model’s nodes depict events that are incorporated into cause and effect relationships within a 
situation or decision process under consideration.  The influence links between the nodes 
(representing causes and effects) graphically illustrate the causal relationship between a pair of 
connected events.  Within SIAM, this relationship may be either “reinforcing” (event A increases 
the likelihood of event B) or reversing (the occurrence of A reduces the likelihood of B).  
Arrowhead terminators identify reinforcing links, and solid circle terminators identify reversing 
links.  [Figure 1] 
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Decision-makers often require the capability to examine multiple courses of action in real 
or near-real time.  These decisions may range from those concerning short-fused procurements to 
those with the potential to mitigate the effects of an impending crisis.  “In order to provide a real-
time analytical capability for situations fraught with uncertainty, a rigorous mathematical 
foundation, such as Bayesian inference networks, is required.” [Rosen and Smith, 1999]  The 
problem with using traditional (mathematically-based) processes is that the highly structured, 
observable, repeatable measurements required often do not exist or are not available in support of 
a subjective decision-making process.  Rosen and Smith [1999], in conjunction with members of 
George Mason University’s C3I Center for Excellence, developed the Causal Strengths (CAST) 
algorithm.  This evolutionary approach to model construction “…allows users to assign expert 
judgments to the likelihood of initial-state events and the strengths of the influencing relationship 
between cause and effect.  These parameters are then employed in the standard forward belief 
propagation to compute the cumulative impact of all causes (direct and indirect) on each event in 
the model’s topology.”  [Rosen and Smith, 1999]  The CAST algorithm is the heart of the SIAM 
modeling engine. 
2. SIAM Explained 
SIAM is a software application that provides a graphical interface and underlying 
algorithmic engine combining two well established methods of decision analysis:  the 
mathematical community’s Bayesian inference net analysis; and influence diagramming 
techniques used within operations research.  Once an influence net, as described above, has been 
created, planners and decision-makers must formulate the answers to several questions: 




Of all the factors included in the model, which one (or two or three) has the 
greatest potential to change the situation, assuming other factors remain the 
same? 
What is the chance that a factor will occur changes as the situation evolves?  
How is the desired outcome affected? 
If I apply an influence to one or more factors, what are the unintended side 
effects?   
[Rosen and Smith, 1999] 
Experts can often address these questions within their own domain of expertise; however, 
when confronted with problems that cut across the breadth of enterprise issues or potentially 
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impact significantly different stakeholders, the analytical ability of individuals rapidly comes up 
short.  SIAM facilitates the construction and analysis of Influence Net models. 
Initial nodes are those nodes around the external edge of the net—events that have no 
explicitly modeled cause.  Values assigned to these nodes represent the initial state of the 
environment or issue(s) being modeled.  The current belief of these nodes is manually assigned 
by the modeler based upon input from an expert or group of experts.  The belief slider bar, found 
on the node properties page, is used to adjust the current belief value of the node.  The value of 
this current belief is then used, in conjunction with the nodal link values of the model, to calculate 
a value for all descendent nodes, including the model’s root node.  Values on the belief slider bar 
range from ‘very certain the event is false’ on the left side through the ‘I don’t have a clue’ stage 
in the center to ‘utter certainty that the event is true’ on the far right.  [Figure 2]  
 
Figure 2:  The SIAM Belief Slider 
Current certification and accreditation procedures evaluate systems at a given moment in 
time.  Rather than blindly taking a snapshot at a single point in time, the SIAM environment 
assists in “…modeling the situation to understand what the potential pressure points for change 
might be.” [Rosen and Smith, 1999]  SIAM offers an environment in which the modeler can 
dynamically manipulate the model in order to conduct real-time analysis.   
The ability to set the link strengths of the causal parameters is critical when modeling 
these potential pressure points.  SIAM requires the modeler to answer two opposing causal 
strength parameters: 
• “In a future where the influencing factor were true, would the effect be more or 
less likely to occur? 
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• On the other hand, in an alternate future where the influencing factor were false, 
would the effect be more or less likely to occur?” 
[Rosen and Smith, 1999] 
 
As stated previously, the links may be either reinforcing, the strength of the link supports 
the positive influence of the node; or reversing, where the positive nodal value has a negative 
influence on the resulting effect.  The mechanics of setting the link strength values is similar to 
using the belief slider.  [Figure 3]  
 
Figure 3:  The SIAM Link Value Slider Bars 
 
3. Applying  SIAM 
The operational benefits of SIAM often are realized well after the models are constructed.  
However, the learning process that occurs during model construction is critical.  The development 
of a model, that accurately reflects the modeled environment, forces technicians and decision-
makers to form more accurate and increasingly detailed assessments of their surroundings.  This 
requirements determination process often identifies problems or issues that had been previously 
obscured under layers of technology or procedure.  From an operational and managerial point of 
view, the tools and techniques available for the analysis of a given model are robust and easy to 
use.  Alternate futures are simple to explore.  Belief values for a given node or nodes can be 
changed and the display refreshed using the “Belief Evaluation” button.  By adjusting link 
strengths on-the-fly, modelers can compensate for an incorrect intuitive supposition that a 
particular factor holds little importance.  The automated belief evaluation algorithm can display 
overlooked or forgotten paths of influence.  Results generated can indicate whether several paths 
of relatively weak influence combine to produce an unexpected strongly influenced outcome.  
There are two major techniques available for the analysis of SIAM models:  impact analysis and 
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sensitivity analysis.  The impact analysis “allows users to identify whether or not a single ‘silver 
bullet’ exists.”  [Rosen and Smith, 1999]  If no single factor surfaces with an overwhelming 
influence, a subset of influence factors must then be used to provide a reasonably sufficient 
impact on the decision process.  Figure 4 shows the relative impacts of factors on the selected 
outcome shown at the top of the graph.  Although simplistic, the figure demonstrates how a factor 
may have an overwhelming impact on a given result.  
 
Figure 4:  SIAM Impact Analysis Results 
 
The sensitivity analysis tool allows slightly finer control in identifying factors that can be 
used to significantly influence a given outcome.  The results of this analysis identifies factors that 
have a greater or lesser potential to alter the outcome of a selected event.  [Figure 5]  Factors with 
wider shaded regions on the right hand side of the display have a potentially greater effect on the 
selected outcome.  As shown in the figure, sensitivity can be high or low, based on the value and 
direction of the nodal relationships.  Several parameters, including the degree of multi-path 
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connectivity between influencing factors and influenced outcomes, and the strengths of each pair-
wise cause-effect link exercise control over the factor sensitivity.  
Pressure point sensitivity analysis also provides a graphical representation of the degree 
to which an outcome may be affected by an event.  In Figure 5, the opportunity for the events to 
promote the outcome is about equal.  However, the lack of knowledge concerning operating 
system [OS] feature sets has the potential to significantly inhibit the outcome that an OS is mature 
and stable. 
 
Figure 5:  SIAM Pressure Point Analysis Results 
Other sensitivity analysis tools within SIAM allow modelers to analyze and compare the: 
• Sensitivity of a desired effect to combinations of influencing factors; 
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• Sensitivity of a desired effect to selected factors as influencing relationships 
change over time; and 
• Sensitivity of a desired effect to selected factors as alternate future scenarios, 
called excursions, are triggered. 
[Rosen and Smith, 1999] 
 
In this thesis, SIAM will be used to construct an influence net illustrating the factors and 
events surrounding a specific firewall implementation.  The analysis tools will enable an accurate 
portrayal of how factors influence selected critical outcomes and how pressure point sensitivity in 
the model may be manipulated to increase the effectiveness of actions taken in management of 
the modeled environment.  Using these tools, the comparison of a specific firewall 
implementation to a written policy and set of “best practices” can be made effectively. 
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III. THE MODEL:  ITS DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION 
Previous chapters provide an overview of information assurance and the technical details 
of SIAM.  This chapter provides:   




The process used to create it. 
An overview of the data collection and validation processes. 
And, a quick précis on the analysis strategy. 
A. CONCEPT AND CONTEXT 
The original concept was that a model of the enterprise security policy could be 
constructed that would assist in determining where an organization’s information assurance 
resources should be most effectively allocated.  In pursuit of this goal, it was necessary to 
understand the formulation of strategic policy and system planning for information assurance.  
Research spanned numerous publications, articles, and personal interviews.  Input from agencies 
such as the National Security Agency, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center, San Diego 
[PMW-161], and the Marine Corps Information Technology & Network Operations Center has 
been critical.   
Confidentiality, integrity, and availability are key objectives in information assurance. 
[Pfleeger, 1997; Stallings, 2000; Sterne, 1991]  However, further research revealed that 
identification (authentication and authorization), auditing, and training are critical supporting 
processes enabling the achievement of the three goals listed above.   
None of this is new; however, identification and auditing are often relegated to steerage 
status and training, beyond that required for administrators to be effective, is generally ignored.  
Of the three supporting processes, training has received the least attention in the literature.  
Without proper training administrators will be incapable of maximizing the utility and 
performance of installed security-oriented technology.  Ignorant or uninformed users represent 
vulnerabilities to system security.  The fact that users do not “play by the rules” is often a 
consequence of them either, not knowing what the rules are, or not understanding why the rules 
are important to the well-being of the enterprise. [Kabay, 1996]  People tend to focus on efficient 
job completion versus security measures.  Kaeo [1999] supports this when she says that, 
“…security measures are [often seen as] more of a nuisance than a help.” 
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Based on initial research, I developed a top level influence net built around the root node:  
“Required levels of Security Service have been achieved.”  To be an effective root node (strategic 
objective), the required levels of service must be well defined.  The top level of the strategic 
model shows the six primary security functions.  [Figure 1]  The six categories of security service 
that I defined as top-level parents to the root node were: 






Integrity controls are effective 
Availability of information meets applicable standards (formal expectations 
within an organization) 
Identity procedures are adequate 
Audit tools and procedures are effectively utilized 
Training standards have been met 
Recall from the Background [Chapter II] that parent nodes are those nodes within the 
model that exert an influence on the child (or target) node.  In Figure 6, the root node is the child 
of all six parents. 
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 Figure 6:  Initial Top Level IA Net 
B. THE MODEL TODAY 
This thesis focuses on a specific firewall implementation as implementation influences 
the goals:  Integrity controls are effective; and that, Availability of information [within the 
system] meets applicable standards.    Applicability of the tool is demonstrated through the 
analysis and reporting mechanisms that can be applied to a practical implementation.  ‘Drilling 
down’ or navigating through the model from the conceptual top level to the specific 
implementation level exercises this functionality. 
1. Orientation 
The model has been layered to better address the diversity of processes that influence 
effective information assurance.    Within the model [Figure 7], parent nodes focusing on system 
availability (2) and integrity (3) support the root node (1).  System availability (2) and integrity 
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(3) are both dependent on, among other criteria, logical security (as opposed to physical security) 
(4), and firewalls (5) contribute to logical security.  The effectiveness offered by the firewall 
relies on the quality of the installation and configuration (6), as well as the effectiveness of 
operational (7) and administrative (8) procedures.  Of course, other technical solutions such as 
intrusion detection, content scanning of email, etc., contribute to the logical security of a network 
environment.  These other classes of technology are not specifically addressed in this thesis but 
should be considered targets for integration in the future. 
 
Figure 7:  Model Topography 
The model supporting this research is broken down into three logical components:  
Installation and Configuration, Operations, and Administration  [Figure 8], all of which directly 
influences the primary goal that Firewalls are correctly installed and effectively utilized.  Each of 
these major divisions has been further divided into a layered set of influencing events or actions.  
The goal of this decomposition is to reduce event possibilities to a dichotomous series of “yes” or 
“no” approximations. 
Careful attention to model granularity is essential.  SIAM is designed to calculate the 
relative influence of all model nodes, via the nodal values and link strengths, on the designated 
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root node.  Granularity can become so fine that the utility of the model may be adversely affected 
through diluted calculations.  Similarly, models in which the initial nodes are not reduced to 
“yes,” “no,” or “maybe” answers suffer the same fate. [Chapter II] 
 
Figure 8:  Firewall Root and Associated Parent Nodes 
a. Installation and Configuration 
The correct installation and configuration of a technology solution is the first 
step, beyond policy development and planning, toward securing a target system.  Practical 
experience among domain experts demonstrates that securing a system is significantly easier 
when installation is done correctly the first time than it is to find and repair all of the possible 
weaknesses when the installation is not done correctly.  Firewall vulnerabilities are frequently 
published on the Internet and in trade periodicals.  This places firewall administrators on a 
constant ‘assess and patch’ cycle.  A weak installation merely exacerbates this problem. 
Requirements for reasonably secure firewall implementations are well 
documented.  Commonly accepted “best practices” [NIST], the Information Technology 
Standards Guidance [USN ITSG, 1999], and specific organizational firewall policies or 
recommendations, such as those found in the Marine Corps [USMC, 2000] and Navy [USN, 
1999], help to clarify firewall requirements before actual operation. 
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 Figure 9:  Installation and Configuration 
Figure 9 shows the topography of the installation and configuration segment of 
the model.  One challenge with the model is allowing for binary influence nodes.  Manufacturer 
passwords have been changed is one such node.  If the default configuration password is not 
changed, the system is significantly more vulnerable regardless of what other measures have been 
implemented.  One recommendation that has been discussed between Dr. Julie Rosen, LCDR Ray 
Buettner, and the writer is the inclusion of a binary value capability within SIAM.  The option  to 
use a binary influence would enhance the effectiveness of this segment of the model.  
Specifically, if the stock password (one applied by the manufacturer) is not changed, all other 
processes are invalidated as the system has a potentially catastrophic weakness. [Figure 9] 
b. Operations 
The operations-oriented nodes shown in Figure 5 reflect a focus on requirements, 
incident recovery, and traffic flow.  Generally, firewall operations are heavily automated.  Basic 
rule sets are executed automatically.  Firewall applications and tools constantly scan the traffic 
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flow searching for anomalies.  These tools cover diverse functions such as content scanning, mail 
filtering, and cueing/inspection of fragmented packets. 
Even a labor-intensive event like disaster recovery is based on automated 
underpinnings.  Supporting technologies such as intrusion detection; and supporting actions such 
as intrusion response, automated backups of firewall rule sets, and dynamic recovery/fail-over are 
important in preventing disastrous circumstances or in assisting technicians in the recovery 
process.  [Tipton & Krause, 2000]   
 
Figure 10:  Firewall Operations and Administration 
Automated operational events have direct impacts upon the administrative 
management of systems.  Figure 10 illustrates the connection between operational events such as 
content scanning or data logging and active systems management or auditing.  Disaster recovery 
and recovery from deliberate change (those systemic changes deliberately implemented by 
authorized personnel as part of configuration management) are similarly connected through the 
automation of configuration files and rule set backups.  Although often not manifest in an 
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operational environment, these connections are intuitively correct, or have face validity, to 
domain experts.  [MITNOC, 2001; JIOC, 2001] 
c. Administration 
System administration must be a proactive process, particularly in the volatile 
environment of firewall management.  Two functions are critical: 
1. Active management and auditing of system information;  
2. And methods to assist in recovery from deliberate changes. 
Of these two functions, interviews have indicated that secure management of 
changing configurations and recovering from deliberate change is often the most challenging 
aspect of firewall administration. [MITNOC, 2001]  This is born out in the model as it shows 
patch application and maintenance of system backups as the two most critical items within the 
administrative chain.  Again, the model illustrates multi-path connections [Figure 10] and 
influences that may not be intuitively obvious. 
C. DATA COLLECTION 
Data was collected to both populate the link values and set the initial node values for the 
model implementation tests (excursions).  This data collection supported the validation of the 
model and face validity  of the subsequent analysis results. 
1. Asking the “Right Questions Right” 
The questions asked, how they are framed, and how surveys are constructed all influence 
the quality of data collected. 
At a SIAM workshop [Buettner, 2001], the various methods used to set the link and node 
values were discussed.  One problem, raised repeatedly, was how easily results can be skewed 
through inattention to the formulation of questions asked to flesh out the model.  This illustrates 
how subjective changes to the model can affect the representation of configuration processes and 
management of security related components. 
When questioned, one group of SIAM modelers indicated that the relative influence of 
each parent node on each child node was set using a variation of correlation analysis techniques.  
These influences were rated against all of the other influences affecting the child node in 
question.  Ergo, the reinforcing or reversing influence of each parent was prioritized relative to all 
other influences affecting the designated child node.   
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When this technique was used, the models suffered from influences that did not 
consistently represent the system environment.  The influences observed were often skewed in 
either a reinforcing or reversing manner.  The right questions may have been asked, but the focus 
on prioritizing the answers produced consistently invalid results. 
2. Questions and Answers 
Two methods are commonly used to establish link and node values for SIAM models:  
face-to-face encounters (interviews or collaborative conferences) and surveys/questionnaires.  I 
have found that interviews, conducted in combination with focused surveys, have been critical to 
the modeling effort undertaken during this research.  The surveys [Appendix C] assist in 
quantifying specific criteria within the model relative to the application’s zero-to-one scale of 
values.  [Chapter II]  Face-to-face exposure to domain experts improves the ability of the modeler 
to ascertain the existence and relative importance of intangible characteristics.  E.g., in most 
systems, the impact of user and administrator training is difficult to quantify when just using 
numerical systems.  However, the relative influence of training on the overall security posture can 
be captured by a group of domain area experts. 
a. Interviews 
Face-to-face sessions with domain experts were conducted at the Marine Corps 
Information Technology/Network Operations Center, the Joint Information Operations Center, 
PMW-161 at the Space and Naval Warfare Command – San Diego, and the National Security 
Agency.  These interviews were critical to establishing the face validity of the baseline model 
topography.  The domain area experts interviewed were able to rapidly understand the model 
output and envision its application to real-world scenarios. 
b. Surveys 
Two surveys, described in Appendix C, were created to support this research 
effort.  The first survey was designed to support the assignment of link values and the second 
assigned values to the model’s initial nodes.  Chapter 2 provides more information  on both links 
and nodes.  The surveys focus the thoughts of domain experts on the model topics and serve as a 
record of how the model was calibrated and results generated. 
3. Setting the Values for Links and Nodes 
Setting values for the links and initial modes within the model is essential (the mechanics 
of setting these values are covered in detail in Chapter 2.)  Without detailed input from domain 
area experts, the model is reduced to an academic exercise conducted in a vacuum.   
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In order to generate consistently reliable results, the link values must be set individually 
(i.e. focus on a single parent relative to a single child), and the links must address the reinforcing 
or reversing nature of the influence when the parent has a logical truth value.  Anecdotal evidence 
indicates that correlation analysis, and other techniques comparing relative link values to each 
other, provides dramatically skewed results.  [Buettner, 2001] 
D. MODEL CONSTRUCTION AND VALIDATION 
Two excursions (model versions, representing the test cases, where values were added to 
the baseline topography) were created as a result of the test runs of the model.  The first run was 
conducted with systems engineers from the MITNOC, and the second with the Vulnerability 
Assessment Team at the Joint Information Operations Center.  This section details the mechanics 
of how the model was constructed, validated, calibrated, and verified. 
1. Initial Construction 
Reading applicable reference material, often out-dated before publication, is essential to 
understanding basic IA requirements.  However, actively including domain experts, intimately 
involved with target systems, enables the modeler to accurately reflect the environment being 
modeled.  The process used to construct the model for this thesis was similar to that used to build 
influence models in the Information Warfare domain. [Rosen and Smith, 1996]  A combination of 
hard-copy intelligence (in this case, literature from recognized experts), and input from subject 
matter experts was used to develop the baseline topography of the model.  [Buettner, 2001] 
A range of domain experts was consulted during the initial research phase of this 
thesis.  This process continued through the model formulation and execution phases.  The input of 
domain experts was critical to crossing the gap between the managerial perspective and the 
technical implementation.  Without this input the model would remain an academic, theoretical 
exercise.   
2. Validation 
Effective information security, security that efficiently secures resources and has minimal 
impact on the daily duties of users, is difficult.  The efforts required to balance the necessity for 
defense in depth, intrusion detection and response, and traffic control at the firewall with 
accessibility and ease of use for users are massive.  As such, it is very easy for a modeler to game 
the model to produce the desired response, instead of an accurate response based on well 
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developed inputs.  The model would then cease to accurately reflect reality.  Therefore, it must be 
validated. 
Face validity represents a reasonable simplification of reality; an “intuitive correctness” 
of the model to domain area experts. [Carley, 2001]  The validation process, represented by 
establishing face validity with domain experts, is essential to continued progress with the model.  
The basic framework of the model should intuitively reflect the modeled environment.  If the 
baseline topography of the model does not accurately reflect the environment being modeled then 
analysis results will be similarly skewed.  By validating the baseline with domain experts, an 
‘applicably general model with useful specificity’ is created.  This validated baseline is then 
easily calibrated for each excursion implementation.   
The focus of the validation phase is confirmation of whether the strategic goal, and web 
of events affecting achievement or failure in pursuit of that goal, accurately depicts the modeled 
environment with a reasonable degree of accuracy.  A couple of questions are addressed to 
domain experts:   
Does the topography of the model accurately reflect the environment modeled at an 
intuitive level?   
• 
• Does a domain expert look at the model and consider it laughably inaccurate? 
The face validity of the baseline topography was achieved during face-to-face sessions 
with domain experts.  Without achieving face validity, even subjective calibration of the model 
becomes an exercise in futility.  The ‘test’ amounted to an assessment of the intuitive correctness 
of the model based upon the accumulated expertise and knowledge of the participating people.  
During each session, the model met the experts’ expectations and addressed those issues 
considered to be important influences on IA for a firewall system. 
3. Calibration 
Once the initial model construction has been completed and face validity confirmed, 
establishing link values is the next step.  This is the calibration phase.  Calibration of the model 
applies it to a specific target environment.  The model assumes the characteristics of the example.  
During this phase, values are assigned to both links and nodes.   
Values may be set using surveys, individual interviews, collaborative processes, or some 
combination of the three.  The surveys created in support of this thesis [Figures 11 and 12] were 
used in conjunction with interviews to establish the link and node values within the model for 
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each excursion.  A modified Delphi approach was used to guide the survey/interview process.  A 
Delphi approach is one in which individual estimates are made by several raters.  The estimates 
are then collected, reproduced and distributed to the participants.  Raters are given an opportunity 
to modify ratings based on colleagues’ input.  After appropriate revisions are made, consistent 
values are applied and inconsistent ones are discussed further.   [Pfleeger, 1997]  INSTALLATION AND CONFIGURATION: 
 
1. The desired outcome is that the firewall configuration meets common criteria and 
security standards.  What is the overall effect on the potential outcome if the following 





































































A. If the manufacturer passwords have been changed.        
B. If the manufacturer passwords have NOT been 
changed.        
C. If the firewall(s) is/are physically secure.        
D. If the firewall(s) is/are NOT physically secure.         
Because SIAM
a strict Delphi approac
analysis tools significa
represent the environmFigure 11:  Sample from the Link Value Survey provides a dynamic environment, simplifying model revisions, following 
h was unnecessary.  The color coded visual representation and the robust 
ntly enhance the ease with which a model can be tuned to most accurately 
ent being modeled.  One must be aware of what question is asked and the 
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manner in which the question was asked.  How the questions on a SIAM survey are worded, has 
great bearing on the validity of the results.   
To begin setting the link values, one must address the statement in the child node. [Figure 
11]  What is the goal?  Then ask the standard question:  What is the overall effect on the potential 
outcome if the conditions have, or have not, been met?  Note that the basic question is positive in 
nature.  However, the conditions that apply are either positive and negative; either on or off.  One 
must address both positive and negative aspects of the link on an individual basis.  By posing the 
questions in this fashion I have found that the results do not become skewed as often happens 
with “check box” surveys.  [Buettner, 2001] 
The values set for links should reflect the direction of influence (reinforcing or reversing) 
parent node-to-child node and the degree (no impact to significantly impacts) to which the parent 
influences the child.  The values for initial nodes reflect the level of truth exhibited in each 
statement, from compete uncertainty to certainly true or certainly false.  A more detailed 
description of this is found in Chapter II. 

































































































1. The manufacturer passwords have been 
changed. 
 
       
 
2. The firewall(s) is/are physically secure.          
3. The firewall(s) are installed by Authorized   
Figure 12:  Sample from the Node Value Surevey 
27 
Values for initial nodes are easily set using a straight survey.  [Figure 12]  One key is 
dividing the survey along the same lines as the initial tier of parent nodes that influence the root 
node.  By doing so, I was able to easily group the initial nodes, thereby providing logical breaks 
for those completing the survey.  The initial nodes should be written such that both the model and 
the survey make a positive statement.  “Such and such HAS been done, accomplished, etc.”  The 
nodal survey addresses the relative truth of this statement.  The statement either has or has not 
been accomplished. 
Only by using both positive statements to address nodes, and by addressing link effects 
on a case-by-case basis, can the full power of SIAM’s algorithmic engine [Chapter 2] be realized.  
If the modeler attempts to “game” the system by using double or triple negatives then the model 
will probably give the “desired” result; however, the result is often worthlessly skewed in an 
operational environment.  In this case, any intuitive value inherent in the visualization within 
the model is lost. 
The survey technique used in this thesis provided an efficient vehicle for the rapid 
customization of the model to specific operational scenarios.  The calibration process took 
between three and four hours, from start to finish (this time included survey administration and 
application of the results to the model), and produced analysis results that were consistent with 
domain expert opinion and expectations. 
4. Verification 
While validation of the baseline model (model without link and node values) was 
conducted before calibration for specific scenarios, verification is conducted after values have 
been added to a specific example (known as a model excursion).  The verification phase is 
composed of an initial analysis of the model and comparison of the rough results with expert 
opinion.  In this phase the modeler must go back to the domain area experts to ensure that the 
environmental model maps correctly, and that the output of the model similarly meets 
expectations.  If there are gaps in information, then the outputs from the model will appear 
skewed in a manner that is not supported by the experience of experts. 
The model may very well return unexpected results.  However, upon further scrutiny, 
domain area experts often are able to come to well-reasoned, supportable conclusions as to why 
the model returned the result in question.  [MITNOC, 2001; JIOC, 2001]  Because the SIAM 
utilities encourage the documentation of the thought processes and reasoning put into model 
construction, the dynamic application environment assists in hypothesis testing. 
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Designed as a collaborative decision tool, SIAM supports model verification through a 
variety of analysis/reporting tools.  The software augments a decision process when properly 
used.  During the verification process, the robust SIAM analysis tools encourage discussion 
among domain experts, as well as between technicians and decision-makers, ensuring that the 
rationale behind links and nodes is on hand to support or refute arguments.   
5. Challenges Presented  
The challenges represented by this model revolve around the need for domain expert 
participation.  Integrating the human factor is inherently challenging in any technical system.  
Technical systems are predictable.  Humans are not.  However, without human input, the relative 
influences of specific characteristics within the model become difficult to determine.  Domain 
area experts provided the insight needed to determine the aspects of firewall operations important 
to an organization under specific conditions. 
E. ANALYSIS STRATEGY 
Actual analysis of the individual excursions is secondary to the proof of concept of the 
applicability of the model itself.  When applied to specific scenarios, the model works.  The 
findings of this thesis will be covered from two perspectives:  response from the domain area 
experts; and excursions of the model.    The model is scaleable.  Excursion 1 represents an 
enterprise systems view while Excursion 2 exhibited a more localized organizational viewpoint. 
Initial analysis of the two excursions showed results that matched the domain experts’ 
expectations.  In Excursion 1 correct installation and configuration was the function exercising 
the greatest influence on the root node.  In Excursion 2, firewall administration held sway.  The 
dichotomy between the two excursions demonstrates the difference in perspective between the 
systems engineers in Excursion 1 and the vulnerability assessment team of Excursion 2.   
The following chapters will demonstrate how the model can be used to identify potential 
opportunities for decision-makers to make incremental investments in security, thereby increasing 























IV. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
The previous chapter provides a detailed description of the mechanical processes used to 
construct, validate, calibrate, and verify the model.  This chapter will focus on responses from 
domain area experts and a description of the excursions that were conducted..    The importance 
of the interview responses and implications of the successful excursion results will also be 
covered. 
A. DOMAIN EXPERTS’ RESPONSE 
The modal initial response from domain experts to the thesis concept was “…it sounds 
like a great idea, I just don’t think it can be done.”  The idea that one could construct a model that 
assisted in the prioritization of critically influential factors, in an organizational information 
assurance structure, was novel.  
1. Methods 
Domain experts were critical in the construction of this model.  Informal interviews were 
conducted during the initial construction, validation, and verification phases; formal surveys were 
used in conjunction with interviews to collect data inputs during the calibration phase. 
Four organizations were specifically targeted, although numerous organizations and 
agencies informally influenced the direction and mode of this research:   




The Joint Information Operations Center 
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center, San Diego 
The National Security Agency 
Each made the requisite experts within their structures available.  Twenty-five domain 
experts, across these four organizations, were consulted over the course of this research 
Although email was used to establish contacts, most of the interviews conducted were 
conducted in person.  First-hand contact enhanced an understanding of the environment being 
modeled, improved the experts’ understanding of the project and appeared to foster cooperation 
that may have increased the accuracy and intuitive correctness of the model. 
2. Findings 
The domain experts consulted ranged from decision-makers to vulnerability assessment 
specialists to systems engineers and information assurance technicians.  While consensus was 
31 
reached during the construction and validation phases, each of these groups brought a unique 
perspective to the calibration and verification phases. 
In general, the groups remained true to their stereotypes:  decision-makers were more 
concerned with administration and operations while technicians focused on the implementation of 
technology.  The backgrounds, skill sets, and cultures of these two groups significantly influence 
the manner in which they approach problems and issues.  Similarly, solutions are crafted upon 
these biases.  Future research on this topic should include a solid evaluation of the obvious 
differences in the perspectives of these two groups. 
The perspectives exhibited by the systems engineers and the vulnerability assessment 
specialists were extremely interesting.  Given the similar backgrounds of these two groups, I 
expected similar responses to the model.  That was not the result observed.  The systems 
engineers focused on the installation and configuration of a firewall implementation.  In contrast, 
the vulnerability assessment specialists considered firewall system administration to be most 
important.  Installation and configuration was still important, but the vulnerability assessment 
technicians felt that systemic weaknesses could be mitigated through better administration. 
The variation between the group of systems engineers and the vulnerability technicians 
was unexpected and counter-intuitive.  Both groups have technical backgrounds.  The expectation 
was that both groups would have similar perspectives. 
Upon further consideration, the reason for the difference became apparent.  The systems 
engineers deal with installation and configuration of hardware/software on a daily basis.  
Operational and administrative functions follow.  The vulnerability assessment technicians deal 
with post installation systems.  The environment assessed by this group is one in which 
administrative actions and operational decisions are the focus.  Often the vulnerabilities identified 
are ones that have occurred due to administrative oversights.  Bad installation and poor 
configurations leave systems highly vulnerable.  Administrative time is consumed by patch 
research and application while availability degrades due to system downtime or exposure.  The 
model improves the ability of domain experts to visualize a specific system within a common 
framework useful to both decision-makers and technicians.  
B. MODEL EXCURSIONS 
The two excursions used in this research exercise the calibration and verification phases 
of the development process.   
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1. Methods 
There are three steps required to calibrate and verify the model in a specific scenario.   
Establish the link values for the model • 
• 
• 
Populate the initial nodes 
Conduct a thumbnail analysis to ensure intuitive correctness of the model  
The process used to define each excursion took three to four hours to complete. 
a. Step One:  Establishing Excursion Link Values 
Establishing the link values within the model involves building a consensus 
among domain area experts on the relative influence of each parent node on its respective child 
node (nodes, in the case of multi-path chains).  This influence is reflected in two planes:  If the 
parent is ‘true’ does it reinforce (make more true) or reverse (make more false) the child node; 
and if the parent is ‘false’ does it reinforce or reverse the child node?  The surveys used to 
establish the links values [Appendix C] addressed the parent node and relative influence for each 
associated child. 
b. Step Two:  Populating the Excursion Initial Nodes 
The survey used to establish values for the initial nodes was similar to that used 
to establish the link values.  In this instance, the survey addressed the relative certainty of each 
initial node.  This certainty ranges from ‘extremely certain’ to ‘extremely uncertain’.  While the 
results are determined through background calculations on a zero-to-one range, the output is 
color-coded to improve intuitive recognition of the model’s results.  Populating the initial nodes 
enables the Bayesian inference net calculations to be conducted in the background.  [Rosen & 
Smith] 
c. Step Three:  Conducting a thumbnail analysis 
This analysis is merely an informal review of initial model results with the 
organization domain area experts.  It supports the model verification phase described in the 
previous chapter.  The purpose of this initial review is to ensure that the model and the output of 
the model mesh with the intuitive expectations of the experts.  If the output varies greatly from 
reasonable expectations or explanation, then further analysis is required to ensure that values for 
links and initial nodes accurately reflect the organizational environment. 
2. Findings 
Gaining access to qualified domain experts qualified to provide the required data was the 
biggest challenge.  The second challenge was asking the correct questions in the correct manner.  
33 
My experience with this research indicates that how the questions are asked is almost as 
important as what questions are asked with respect to establishing model validity and output 
viability. 
By combining surveys and interviews, I found there was little confusion among 
participants in relation to purpose and execution, and that the resulting inputs accurately reflected 
reality within the systems being modeled.  One set of modelers that I spoke with was attempting 
to use correlation analysis data collection techniques in order to establish the link values within a 
SIAM model.  While commonly used in operations research/analysis, this technique appears to 
consistently skew the results of SIAM models when used to set link values. [Buettner, 2001] 
I chose to administer both surveys in a collaborative environment during each excursion.  
An alternative is to administer the surveys to individual participants using the Delphi approach.  
This would require that the surveys be administered/collected, have the results tallied and then 
normalized, with the resulting normalized output applied to the model links.   A strict Delph-
based process would include a round of response revisions between the collection of the results 
and their tallying.  This round of revisions is an opportunity for raters to change assigned values 
based on the inputs of their peers.  While potentially less accurate, using this modified Delphi 
approach proved less complicated and less time consuming.  A  drawback of this approach is the 
potential for a single strong personality to dominate.  In this situation it is up to the modeler, 
serving in the role of moderator, to drive the discussion and ensure that the process remains 
collaborative. 
The surveys used to populate data points within a SIAM model must accurately reflect 
the nature and characteristics of the model itself.  Attention to detail, treating the values of link 
strengths individually, and ensuring that initial nodes are reduced to statements about which the 
relative truth can be determined will assist in closely mapping the surveys to the model. 
The model effectively represented the modeled environments in both excursions.  In each 
case, the overall results paralleled the expectations of domain experts.  The model did identify 




V. BEYOND CLASSICAL RISK ANALYSIS 
Risk analysis is a process undertaken to determine the exposures within a system and 
their potential harm.  The process forces the systematic study of the exposures and assists in 
justifying the type or quantity of security required.  [Pfleeger, 1997]  Although, the purpose of the 
model is to support the justification of security processes or techniques, just as classical risk 
analysis does.  This model does not conduct risk assessments in the classical sense.  Rather, it 
expands on classical methods in order to: 
Enhance visualization of the target system. • 
• 
• 
Provide a dynamic evaluation environment, responsive to rapidly changing 
information assurance requirements. 
Encourage dialog between decision-makers and technicians through the provision 
of a common frame of reference. 
The model evaluates, prioritizes, and graphically illustrates shortfalls within two 
systems based on the relative importance of specific criteria as established by domain experts.  It 
also facilitates the extraction of implicit or tacit knowledge from these same domain experts that 
would not emerge during classical risk analysis.   
To Will Ozier, risk analysis “…represents the process of analyzing a target environment 
and the relationships of its risk-related attributes.” [Ozier, 2000]  Some benefits of conducting a 
careful risk analysis include:   
1. Improving awareness of security issues.  
2. Identification of assets, vulnerabilities, and controls.  
3. Improving the basis for decisions. 
4. Justifying expenditures for security.   
[Pfleeger, 1997]   
Using these criteria, construction and subsequent use of the model constitutes a risk 
analysis.  The model provides a dynamic environment that inherently tracks the relative 
importance of factors directly and indirectly influencing the strategic security goal; classical risk 
analysis is inherently static. 
Use of the model offers several improvements over the classical approach.  The model 
graphically illustrates the relationships of which Ozier [2000] spoke. Additionally, the model 
provides a more dynamic environment.  One can adjust individual criteria and generate 
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immediate feedback on the potential systemic benefit or loss associated with the new value.  The 
model also provides a common frame of reference for decision-makers and technicians during the 
evaluation process.  This common picture further supports the accuracy and utility of the model in 
the development of a more uniform security posture.   The significant benefit over classical 
techniques is the ability to gauge results in regards to their systemic impact on enterprise goals 
and objectives.  This correlation is not automatic using classical risk analysis. 
Risk analysis usually focuses on the risks associated with not spending money on 
information assurance.  It focuses on what costs might be incurred based on a bad event 
occurring.  These costs are used to calculate the return on investment for a given expenditure.  
Peltier states that, “The goal of risk analysis is not to eliminate all risk.  It is a tool to be used by 
management to reduce risk to an acceptable level.” [Peltier, 2001]   
Classical risk analysis identifies potential threats, the potential frequency of occurrence, 
and the potential costs associated with a threat occurrence and the subsequent recovery.  The 
model presented here serves as a planning tool that assists decision-makers and technicians in 
evaluating the current status of a target system and then prioritizing which combination of assets, 
procedures, and security techniques may improve (or decrease) the overall security posture in 
relation to the goals and objectives of the enterprise. 
A. QUANTITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS 
Quantitative risk analysis involves assigning numerical values to (1) monetary criteria, 
(2) observed percentages, (3) annualized rates of occurrence, and (4) bounded distributions.  
These four metrics are applied to the standard six risk elements:   






Threat frequency  
Threat exposure factor  
Recommended safeguard effectiveness  
Safeguard cost  
Uncertainty   
[Peltier, 2001] 
Benefits revolve around the numerical basis of the data and statistical analysis conducted 
on the data collected.  Relative values of information, often expressed in monetary terms, are 
often better understood by decision-makers.  In government and the Department of Defense, 
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systems losses and relative values of information may be expressed in terms of value to national 
security, lives of personnel, or significant losses of equipment and resources.  Because assessment 
results are generally based on monetary values, percentages, and annualized probabilities a 
credible basis for cost/benefit assessment is assumed and risk management performance tracked 
and evaluated. [Ozier, 2000]  Quantitative risk analysis is particularly effective when evaluating 
tangible assets. 
The difficulties seen with quantitative techniques are focused on the relative complexity 
of associated calculations and the extremely involved data collection process required to support 
them. 
B. QUALITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS 
In general, calculations in qualitative analyses are few.  One characteristic commonly 
associated with this analysis technique is that results are essentially subjective in both process and 
metrics.  [Ozier, 2000]  Peltier states that “The qualitative methodology attempts only to prioritize 
the various risk elements in subjective terms.”   
A qualitative risk analysis can be reduced to a generic ten-step process: 
1. Developing a statement of scope. 
2. Selecting domain area experts to participate. 
3. Identification of potential threats. 
4. Prioritization of identified threats. 
5. Prioritization of the impact should a threat occur. 
6. Calculation of the total threat impact. 
7. Identification of potential safeguards. 
8. Cost-benefit analysis of potential safeguards. 
9. Prioritization of safeguards. 
10. Completion of the risk analysis report. 
[Peltier, 2001] 
The subjective nature of qualitative risk assessment makes it very useful when evaluating 
both tangible and intangible resources, e.g. the value of an organization’s reputation would be 
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very difficult to quantify in any meaningful manner.  Savvy domain area experts are required in 
order to effectively and efficiently organize and assess the relative values of these assets.   
C. MODEL BENEFITS 
The goal of the model is to enhance communication between decision-makers and 
technicians.  It does this by providing a justifiable, prioritized list of security actions that can 
potentially raise the organizational security posture.  The graphical nature of the output, offering 
observers the opportunity to visualize relationships, is the driving factor in improving 
communications between these two groups. 
The classical risk assessment is static.  It does not provide a collaborative environment 
that dynamically supports enhanced communications between technicians and decision-makers.  
“What-if” forecasting in support of changing situations or requirements is not easily conducted 
using either quantitative or classical qualitative techniques. 
The model, as executed in this thesis, provides this collaborative decision support in a 
target environment.  It enhances the ability of the modeler (technician or decision-maker) 
executing the model to prioritize the key influential actions (based on organizational priorities) 
within a specific implementation.  Moreover, it enhances the modeler’s ability to game potential 
outcomes in an effort to determine what will best serve the strategic goals and core processes of 
the organization.  By adjusting the values of initial nodes or link strengths, a modeler can project 
what the influence may be of positive or negative changes within the target environment. 
Classical risk analysis is recommended, like strategic plans, to be re-evaluated on an 
annual basis.  This process is involved, and labor intensive.  The SIAM model created during this 
research requires a level of effort similar to classical risk analysis methods initially.  However, 
once the baseline model for an organization has been established, the model provides an 
inherently dynamic environment.  Follow-on maintenance and re-calibration of the model to 
ensure accurate representation of the modeled environment is significantly easier. Re-evaluation 
of the system and re-prioritization of potential expenditures can be conducted each time system 
modifications or updates are made, new potential threats or safeguards are identified, or as 
enterprise goals and objectives change.   
The model can cut the time, effort, and financial resources required to conduct periodic 
system evaluations and assist in projecting future expenditures most likely to contribute to a 
higher overall enterprise security posture.  The reduction in required resources exceeds 50%.  
38 
Individual attributes can be adjusted or updated and the relative influences automatically 
recalculated.  Additionally, sequential updates can be captured as separate excursions and 
compared using SIAM’s cross-excursion analysis utility.  Although challenging to construct, the 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
If a strategic goal is articulated and a series of objectives or processes influencing the 
achievement of that goal defined, then a SIAM model may be applied as a potential solution.  The 
model constructed as a result of this research provides a tool that is generic enough to be widely 
applicable and specific enough to offer utility as a communications aid to be used between 
decision-makers and technicians.   
The model developed during this research increases visualization of the environment of a 
system.  It provides a dynamic environment for comparative analysis of system attributes and it 
encourages more focused communications between decision-makers and technicians.  This 
combination of characteristics makes it unique.   
The model possesses a range of utility; from comparative base lining (current or future 
states relative to extant policies, goals, and objectives) to performance evaluations of internal or 
external agencies.   
A. UTILITY OF THE APPLICATION 
This model significantly improves the ability of decision-makers and technicians to 
develop a common frame of reference within a dynamic environment.  Without this common 
frame of reference, decision-makers will continue to allocate resources on an ad hoc basis leaving 
(potentially expensive) vulnerabilities un-addressed.  
1. Comparative Base Lining Relative to Stated Policy and Goals 
The model can be used to develop a baseline assessment of a specific information 
resource security environment in relation to the stated policies, goals and objectives of an 
enterprise. 
2. Comparison of Current States to Baselines 
The flexibility of SIAM’s sensitivity analysis tools enables the effective side-by-side 
comparison of specific states against baselines.  Cross-excursion analysis [Rosen and Smith, 
1999] supports comparisons within single systems, the current states of multiple systems, and 
current states against multiple futures.   
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3. Comparison of Alternatives 
What is the most critical factor when considering incremental investment to achieve 
exponential increases in security posture?  Where can an organization achieve the greatest returns 
on investment? 
These are critical questions when considering how to allocate increasingly scarce 
resources.  Using the model, alternative futures can be compared in pursuit of a more secure 
security posture.  The evaluation tools available within SIAM assist in prioritizing the factors 
exercising the greatest influence over the modeled system such that a determination can be made 
concerning potential returns on investments in security solutions. 
4. Evaluation of Relative Performance Levels for Internal or External 
Agencies 
Just as current states can be compared against baselines or a comparison of alternatives 
made, so too can relative performance evaluations of internal or external agencies be conducted.  
The ability to evaluate technical performance relative to established metrics is common in many 
tools.  However, there are no automated tools currently in existence that allow for the effective 
comparison of relative performance levels that include non-metric based factors.  Evaluating an 
organization based on packets passed or intrusions deflected is common.   
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DOD 
There are two specific applications of this tool that apply to the DoD: 
1. The renovation of the Defense Information Technology Security Certification and 
Accreditation Process (DITSCAP). 
2. The evaluation of Service Level Agreement compliance by the prime and sub-
contractors on the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI).   
1. Comparative Base Lining in Support of Certification and Accreditation 
The DITSCAP is a static evaluation process used to determine organizational 
preparedness to function securely in an information technology intensive environment.  The 
process is used to evaluate organizations, their hardware and software, and their operational 
facilities.  The certification and accreditation process is mandatory for any organization desiring 
connections with the Defense Information Services Network (DISN). 
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Although currently focused on firewall issues, the model generated by this research can 
be modified and expanded to cover all of the topics resident in the DITSCAP.  The establishment 
of relational links between evaluation criteria will greatly enhance the realistic representation of 
the modeled environment during the evaluation.  Additionally, the model provides a dynamic, 
easily maintained, environment within which an evaluation can be conducted or updated.  A 
single attribute can be modified and an update of the model conducted immediately.  This level of 
control has the potential to free up significant manpower when compared to the current system. 
2. Performance Base-lining and Comparative Evaluation 
The NMCI contract currently allows for a bonus incentive structure in addition to the 
straight fee-for-service cost structure.  The bonuses are paid according to the level of compliance 
with the Service Level Agreements (SLAs) upon which the contract is based.  In most cases the 
evaluation of this compliance relies on technical metrics (packets passed successfully, intruders 
detected/thwarted, etc.).  There is no mechanism currently in place that supports evaluation 
of performance levels in relation to the stated policies, goals, and objectives of the NMCI. 
[DON CIO] 
A permutation of the model can evaluate the relative success or failure of the prime and 
sub-contractors in achieving the specified goals and objectives.  This evaluation would 
graphically illustrate the degree to which the SLAs had been achieved thereby giving the 
government and the vendors common ground for discussion of fee-for-service issues as well as 
full or partial bonus incentives.   
A model agreed upon by both parties to the contract supports a common dialog.  Such a 
model provides the government with an evaluative tool that may save unjustified incentives, and 
provides the vendor with a vehicle to argue in favor of bonus incentives for meeting specified 
levels of performance. 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
1. Integration of the Model into the DITSCAP Process 
This modeling technique can be integrated into the DITSCAP process.  Future research in 
this area should focus on constructing a dynamic model to be used in place of the current 
DITSCAP checklist.  The model should evaluate the holistic status of a given enterprise and its 
relative security posture.   
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Integration of the model into the DITSCAP process will entail a significant expansion of 
its existing boundaries.  Instead of focusing solely on firewalls, a model evaluating DITSCAP-
esque requirements must encompass a full range of information assurance issues.  Although this 
will require an investment in human capital up front, the creation of a dynamic environment and 
supporting historical models has the potential to significantly decrease manpower requirements 
during DITSCAP evaluations and reviews over the long term. 
2. Expansion of the Model to Evaluate SLA Compliance in Support of NMCI 
There are thirty-eight SLAs supporting the NMCI contract vehicle. [NMCI, 2000]  
Although not necessarily applicable to all of them, the model can make significant contributions 
to the SLA evaluation process.  Future study in this area should define which SLAs are 
appropriate for application of the model and then construct a set of evaluative models.  These 
sub-models should be constructed with the idea of integrating them into an over-arching NMCI 
model that could be used to provide an effective evaluation of overall program status. 
D. CONCLUSION 
A baseline model was constructed and validated by a group of domain experts.  Test 
cases (excursions within the model) were run successfully and also found to meet the 
expectations of the experts.  Improvements and renovations were applied as a result of 
consultation and interviews with the domain experts.  These modifications enhanced the 
capabilities of the model in both form and function.  Lastly, a comparison was drawn between the 
model (and supporting processes) and the processes used during classical risk analysis.   
The model presented in this thesis represents a mere sliver of the previously unexplored 
potential that the Situational Influence Assessment Module offers in this field.  A dynamic 
environment has been created that enhances the visualization of complex information assurance 
relationships between technical implementations and their impacts on strategic goals and policy.  
By applying this modeling process in an information assurance environment, decision-makers and 
technicians have an opportunity to leverage a common framework.  In doing so, both groups gain 
the ability to communicate more effectively and allocate scarce resources more efficiently. 
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APPENDIX A. FIREWALLS DESCRIBED 
“…If it’s supposed to keep the bad guys out of your network, it’s a firewall.  If it 
succeeds in keeping the bad guys out, while still letting you happily use your network, it’s a good 
firewall; if it doesn’t, it’s a bad firewall.”  [Zwicky, et.al., 2000] 
A. OVERVIEW 
Firewalls are tools used in securing a network from hostile intrusion.  However, they 
have weaknesses.  Inattentive configuration, insufficient physical security, inappropriate rule sets, 
and overly ambitious expectations (born of the panacea that once a firewall is installed and 
organization is secure) all contribute to firewall failures.  As this appendix is provided as a broad-
brush overview, the references provide a wealth of detailed information on firewalls, their 
strengths and weaknesses.   
Firewalls can be many things:  hardware, software, or a combination of the two.  They 
are often thought to be the panacea for information assurance in a networked environment:  
perfect gateways keeping all of the miscreants out, and allowing all authorized users perfect 
access; bastions of security firmly entrenched at the front door of the enterprise.  “People expect a 
firewall to be a solid brick wall protecting some computing resources.” [Pfleeger, 1997] 
1. What is a Firewall? 
Firewalls have been defined in as many different ways as there are products.  A firewall 
is: 
“A process that filters all traffic between a protected or ‘inside’ network and a less 
trustworthy or ‘outside’ network”; [Pfleeger, 1997] 
 “Any security system protecting the boundary of an internal network”; [Gollman, 1999] 
“A network monitor or collection of monitors placed between an organization’s internal 
network and the Internet or between two local area networks (LANs)”; [Denning, 1999a]   
“A system or group of systems that enforces an access control policy on network traffic 
as it passes through access points.” [Brenton, et al., 2001] 
The definition preferred for this thesis is:  a firewall “…is a system of components 
designed to control access to and from your network and an external network, based on the 
security policies in effect at your site.” [Ogletree, 2000] 
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2. Defining an Access Control Policy 
An access control policy is “…simply a corporate policy that states which type of access 
is allowed across an organization’s network perimeters.” [Brenton, et al., 2001] 
Access control policies may cover many different areas within an organization.  They 
may limit the scope of access for authorized users; the types of data that may be passed or 
blocked; or specify data flow direction.   
Access control policies take on two flavors:  Default Deny; and Default Permit.   
a. Default Deny Stance 
That which is not expressly permitted is prohibited.  This is the fail-safe posture 
in the information assurance environment.  This posture “…recognizes that what you don’t know 
can hurt you.” [Zwicky, et al., 2000]  
 Allowed services are specified and all other traffic is denied.  By enabling 
services on a case-by-case basis only, authorized personnel can examine the services users want; 
consider the security implications of providing the desired services; and allow only those services 
that support the mission, core processes, and security objectives of the enterprise. 
b. Default Permit Stance 
That which is not expressly prohibited is permitted.  Laissaiz-faire network 
management.  In this case, all actions are permitted unless they have been specifically denied. 
There is a critical weakness inherent in this policy stance:  “Trying to guess what 
dangers might be in a system or out there on the Internet is essentially an impossible task.” 
[Zwicky, et al., 2000]  This posture tends to degenerate into a sprint between systems 
administrators (to increase security) and users (figuring out cool new ways to do things they are 
not supposed to be doing). 
B. FIREWALL EFFECTIVENESS 
Firewall effectiveness revolves around conscientious and effective installation and 
configuration, and regular maintenance and administration.  Firewalls are most effective when 
employed as a component within a defense-in-depth security solution.  Firewalls cannot be 
installed and then summarily forgotten. 
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1. Capabilities 
As stated previously, firewalls are not a panacea to be indiscriminately strewn around a 
network.  They represent a solid security component that, for the uninformed, can quickly 
contribute to an immensely false sense of security.  The attitude that we have a firewall, 
therefore we must be secure is prevalent at all levels of many organizations.   
In general, firewalls can offer the following benefits: 








Keeping information about…your network from prying eyes outside your 
network. 
Provides audit trails. 




The biggest limitation of firewalls is that they will not protect an organization from an 
inside job.  No matter how secure the firewall installation may be, an authorized user on the 
inside of the boundary layer can potentially cause significant harm to the enterprise network.  
Insider attacks are a very real threat.  Ogletree [2000] comes to the point with his statement that, 
“A firewall is not a substitute for everyday system management and security measures.” 
Zwicky, et al. [2000] provides a quick, concise list of what firewalls CANNOT do: 
Protect against malicious insiders. 
Protect against connections that do not go through them. 
Protect against completely new threats. 
Set themselves up correctly. 
Some other issues that firewalls cannot, in and of themselves, completely defend against 
are:  viruses; Trojan horses; social engineering; physical outages; and user/administrator 
incompetence.  These limitations, inherent in a firewall system, can be mitigated by:   
1. Proactively keeping patches up to date;  
2. Ensuring system configurations are well documented;  
3. Taking advantage of available training for users as well as administrators;  
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4. And, effectively communicating with users. 
[Schultz, 2000] 
C. DECOMPOSITION OF A TECHNOLOGY CLASS 
Firewalls as a class of technology have some common features.  In general, all firewalls 
are designed to perform a border security function, acting as a single point of entry and exit for 
traffic on the network.  They examine network data in transit, based on a set of pre-defined 
criteria, and either pass or drop the data packets as determined by the rule set. 
Firewall functionality is comprised of three fundamental capabilities: 
1. Packet Filtering:  Passing or dropping packets based on characteristics of header 
information; 
2. Network Address Translation:  Converting internal IP addresses to addresses based 
on the firewall in order to conceal them from external monitoring (also called IP 
masquerading); 
3. Proxy Services:  Application layer connections designed to break the network layer 
connection between internal and external hosts. 
[Strebe & Perkins, 2000] 
There are several different types of firewalls, each with unique functional characteristics.  
Simple packet filters, application gateways or proxy servers, and hybrid systems all serve these 
same basic functions.  The primary differences are found in how these basic functions are 
performed and what extended features are available. 
1. Packet Filtering Firewalls 
Packet filters offer relatively minimum security, but do so at a relatively low cost.  The 
biggest advantage of packet filters is that they are fast, flexible and transparent. [Blanding, 2000]  
There are two types of packet filters:  static and dynamic.  Both operate at the network transport 
layer (layer three of the OSI model). [Brenton, 2001]  Firewalls with static packet filtering are the 
simplest and most common.  They compare “…network protocols (such as IP) and transport 
protocols (such as TCP) to a database of rules and forward only those packets that conform to the 
criteria specified in the database of rules.”  [Strebe & Perkins, 2000]  The firewall either passes or 
drops the examined packet.  These firewalls are stateless, there is no record of the network 
session connection or the examined packet after disposition has been made with this type of 
firewall. 
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The dynamic packet filter maintains the state of the connection with a record of the 
communications session for each packet.  If an inbound packet does not contain a request to open 
a session or a response to a recorded outbound request, then, if the system is configured for 
default denial of access the packet or packets are dropped automatically.  Inbound and outbound 
packets can also be screened according to network or transport protocols, origin, destination, etc.  
A dynamic filter can  be expanded further to include stateful filtering.  In this type of filter, rules 
are protocol specific and track session context as well as the states represented in a connection 
table. [Brenton & Hunt, 2001] 
Packet filters are limited to examining the packet header information.  These firewalls 
offer only limited security and should be used as a first line of defense in a defense-in-depth 
scenario in all but the least secure of environments. 
Packet filters can be deployed very effectively as gatekeepers on reasonably secure 
networks.  The packet filter is commonly implemented as a front for a dual-homed host, a 
screened-host configuration, or a screened subnet. [Strebe & Perkins, 2000]  Each configuration 
offers its own strengths and weaknesses. 
2. Application Gateways / Proxy Servers 
Application gateways or proxy servers operate at the application layer (layer seven) of 
the OSI model.  The primary difference between packet filters and proxies is that the “…proxy 
server must understand the application.” [Strebe & Perkins, 2000]  This means that the proxy 
server is application specific.  This specificity allows for great flexibility in configuring the 
firewall---individual application services can be passed or denied. 
The proxy server also serves as a middleman between applications and user service 
requests.  In this role, user requests never reach the destination application.  Rather, the request 
goes to the application gateway.  The gateway translates and forwards the request (based on the 
applicable rule set and using its own IP address as the source address) to the specified service.  
The proxy then receives the response from the service provider as if it was the original requester.  
The response is forwarded (again examining the data given the rule set parameters and using its 
own address as the source address) back to the requesting user.   
The proxy server creates new data packets for both inbound and outbound transmissions.  
As such, the proxy represents a dual identity:  To the user the proxy server is the provider of the 
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requested service; to the service provider, the proxy is the original requester.  This process is bi-
directional.  [Strebe & Perkins, 2000]   
3. Hybrids 
Hybrid systems combine the characteristics of packet filters and proxy servers into a 
single device.  The downside is the inherited set of weaknesses from both systems.  A more 
secure option is to deploy packet filters and proxy servers in mutually supporting configurations 




APPENDIX B. EXCURSION ONE 
The surveys in this appendix do not represent evaluations of production network systems, 
rather the collective experience and compiled opinions of the domain experts surveyed. 
A. MARINE CORPS INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & NETWORK 
OPERATIONS CENTER 
The Link Surveys were created in support of the modeling effort as described in chapters 
two and three.  The link value surveys for each excursion are listed below. 
1. Link Value Survey  
 The following is a survey designed to collect data on the relative values of link strengths 
within the SIAM model.  Completion of the survey should take approximately 45 minutes.  This 
survey may be completed by typing directly into this document and emailing the file back to 
mailto:cpbrodhu@nps.navy.mil; or the survey may be completed in hard copy and faxed back to 
Major Brodhun, Code 32, NPGS, at (831) 656-3681 / DSN 878-4656. 
 
Please fill in the required reference data. 
 
COMMAND:  Marine Corps Information Technology & Network Operations Center 
CONTACT INFO--Phone:  _________________  Email:  ________________________ 
 
 You will see desired outcomes listed below.  Sets of potential conditions are listed in 
tables underneath each outcome.  Place an “X” in the column to the right, which most accurately 
reflects the relative influence of each event on the desired outcome.  This survey is NOT 
concerned with the existence or non-existence of the listed conditions in a specific 
implementation.  Rather, this survey is addressing the RELATIVE IMPACT of the condition on 
the outcome if the condition did or did NOT exist. 
 
INSTALLATION AND CONFIGURATION: 
 
1. The desired outcome is that the firewall configuration meets common criteria and 
security standards.  What is the overall effect on the potential outcome if the following 
conditions have been met? 
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A. If the manufacturer passwords have been changed.       X 
B. If the manufacturer passwords have NOT been 
changed. X       
C. If the firewall(s) is/are physically secure.       X 
D. If the firewall(s) is/are NOT physically secure. X       
E. If the firewall(s) are installed by Authorized 
Personnel only.       X 
F. If the firewall(s) are NOT installed by Authorized 
Personnel. X       
G. If the firewall rule-set has been well defined.      X  
H. If the firewall rule-set has NOT been well defined.  X      
I. If the allowed and disallowed services have been 
specifically defined.       X 
J. If the allowed and disallowed services have NOT 
been specifically defined. X       
K. If the firewall(s) are supported by a secure network 
infrastucture.      X  
L. If the firewall(s) are NOT supported by a secure 
network infrastucture.  X      
M. If the firewall configurations allow for automated 
fail-over capabilities.       X 
N. If the firewall configurations DO NOT allow for 
automated fail-over capabilities. X       
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 2. The desired outcome is to have the firewall rule set be well defined in its initial state.  





































































A. If a split DNS has been implemented.     X   
B. If a split DNS has NOT been implemented.   X     
C. If specific services have been defined as “allowed.”       X 
D. If specific services have NOT been defined as 
“allowed.” X       
E. If specific services have been defined as “denied.”     X   
F. If specific services have NOT been defined as 
“denied.”   X     
G. If the “direction of flow” for each allowed and 
denied service has been determined and set.       X 
H. If the “direction of flow” for each allowed and 
denied service has NOT been set. X       
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 3. The desired outcome is to have the services that are allowed and NOT allowed to pass 
through the firewall(s) to be specifically defined.  What is the effect on this outcome if 





































































A. If services have been specifically defined as 
“allowed.”       X 
B. If services have NOT been specifically defined as 
being “allowed.” X       
C. If services have been specifically defined as 
“denied.”     X   
D. If services have NOT been specifically defined as 
“denied.”   X     
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 4. The desired outcome is to have a stable and mature operating system supporting the 





































































A. If the operating system supporting the firewall has 
been fully tested and patched (i.e., the OS is 
current).       X 
B. If the firewall operating system has NOT been fully 
vetted and patched. X       
C.. If the IP Stack configurations are protected.       X 
D. If the IP Stack configurations have NOT been 
protected. X       
E. If the OS feature set is known and well documented.       X 
F. If the OS feature set is NOT well known. X       
G. If the OS allows system configuration by users.  X      
H. If the OS does NOT allow system configuration by 
users.     X   
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5. The desired outcome is to have a firewall implementation supported by a secure 





































































A. If infrastructure power is clean and protected within 
Enterprise boundaries.      X  
B. If infrastructure power is NOT clean (i.e. subject to 
spikes and brown-outs) and NOT protected within 
the enterprise. X       
C. If emergency power is available in case of an 
infrastructure failure.       X 
D. If emergency power is NOT available in case of an 
infrastructure failure. X       
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 6. The desired outcome is to have a firewall configuration that allows an automated fail-





































































A. If firewalls are installed in pairs to maintain a 
redundant architecture.       X 
B. If firewalls are NOT installed in pairs (thereby 
introducing a single point of failure). X       
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 ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATIONS: 
 
7. The desired outcome is to have a firewall implementation correctly installed and 





































































A. If the firewall implementation configuration meets 
accepted common criteria and security standards.       X 
B. If the firewall implementation configuration does 
NOT meet accepted common criteria and security 
standards. X       
C. If administrative procedures are effective.       X 
D. If administrative procedures are NOT effective.  X      
E. If operational procedures are effective.       X 
F. If operational procedures are NOT effective.  X      
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 8. The desired outcome is that operational procedures are effective in supporting the 
security of the firewall implementation.  What is the effect on this outcome if the 





































































A. If the operational requirements of the organization 
(requirements levied on the system) have been well 
and correctly defined.       X 
B. If the operational requirements of the organization 
(requirements levied on the system) have NOT been 
well defined. X       
C. If procedures are in place to aid in Incident 
Recovery.       X 
D. If procedures are NOT in place to aid in Incident 
Recovery. X       
E. If the traffic flow is closely monitored.      X  
F. If the traffic flow is NOT closely monitored.   X     
G. If the firewall is impairing network throughput.    X    
F. If the firewall is NOT impairing network 
throughput.    X    
 
59 
 9. The desired outcome is that the throughput requirements are being met.  What is the 





































































A. If the operational requirements of the organization 
(requirements levied on the system) have been well 
defined.    X    
B. If the operational requirements of the organization 
(requirements levied on the system) have NOT been 
well defined.    X    
C. If the minimum throughput requirements have been 
defined.       X 
D. If the minimum throughput requirements have NOT 
been defined. X       
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 10. The desired outcome is that procedures are put in place to aid in Incident Recovery.  





































































A. If incident response and reporting procedures are in 
place.       X 
B. If incident response and reporting procedures are 
NOT in place. X       
C. If disaster recovery procedures are defined.       X 
D. If disaster recovery procedures are NOT defined. X       
E. If disaster recovery procedures have been 
disseminated to authorized personnel.       X 
F. If disaster recovery procedures have NOT been 
disseminated to authorized personnel. X       
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 11. The desired outcome is that incident response and reporting procedures are in place and 





































































A. If automated intrusion detection and reporting is 
implemented at the boundary layer.      X  
B. If automated intrusion detection and reporting is 
NOT implemented at the boundary layer.   X     
C. If automated intrusion response has been 
implemented.       X 
D. If automated intrusion response has NOT been 
implemented. X       
E. If dynamic recovery and fail-over capabilities have 
been implemented.      X  
F. If dynamic recovery and fail-over capabilities have 
NOT been implemented.  X      
G. If penetration testing is periodically conducted.     X   
H. If penetration testing is NOT periodically conducted.   X     
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 12.  The desired outcome is that disaster recovery procedures have been put in place.  What 





































































A. If dynamic recovery and fail-over capabilities have 
been implemented.      X  
B. If dynamic recovery and fail-over capabilities have 
NOT been implemented. X       
C. If backups of configuration files and firewall rule 
sets are maintained.       X 
D. If backups of configuration files and firewall rule 
sets are NOT maintained. X       
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 13. The desired outcome is to have the system traffic flow be carefully monitored.  What is 





































































A. If the minimum throughput requirements have been 
defined.      X  
B. If the minimum throughput requirements have NOT 
been defined.   X     
C. If content scanning is effectively conducted at the 
boundary layer.       X 
D. If content scanning is NOT effectively conducted at 
the boundary layer. X       
E. If mail filtering is conducted at the boundary layer.       X 
F. If mail filtering is NOT conducted at the boundary 
layer.  X      
G. If packet fragments are cued, reassembled, and 
inspected at the boundary layer.       X 
H. If fragmented packets are NOT cued, reassembled, 
and inspected at the boundary layer. X       
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 14. The desired outcome is that proactive management and auditing is conducted.  What is 





































































A. If active operational management techniques are 
employed.       X 
B. If active operational management techniques are 
NOT employed. X       
C.. If rule sets are effectively documented and managed.       X 
D. If rule sets are NOT effectively documented and 
managed. X       
E.. If logs are incorporated into the overall audit 
architecture.      X  
F. If logs are NOT incorporated into the overall audit 
architecture.  X      
G.. If trend analysis is conducted on audit and intrusion 
detection logs.      X  
H. If trend analysis is NOT conducted on audit and 
intrusion detection logs.   X     
I. If patches and updates are kept current.       X 
J. If patches and updates are NOT kept current. X       
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 15. The desired outcome is that active, operational management techniques are employed.  





































































A. If content scanning is effectively conducted at the 
boundary layer.       X 
B. If content scanning is NOT effectively conducted at 
the boundary layer. X       
C. If mail filtering is conducted at the boundary layer.       X 
D. If mail filtering is NOT conducted at the boundary 
layer. X       
E. If packet fragments are cued, reassembled, and 
inspected at the boundary layer.       X 
F. If fragmented packets are NOT cued, reassembled, 
and inspected at the boundary layer. X       
E. If automated data logging procedures have been put 
in place.       X 
F. If automated data logging procedures have NOT 
been put in place. X       
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 16. The desired outcome is to have procedures put in place that will support recovery from 





































































A. If backups of configuration files and rule sets are 
maintained.       X 
B. If backups of configuration files and rule sets are 
NOT maintained. X       
C. If configuration criteria and standards are reviewed 
periodically.      X  
D. If configuration criteria and standards are NOT 
reviewed periodically.   X     
E. If remote access control lists are maintained and 
closely monitored.       X 
F. If remote access control lists are NOT maintained 
and closely monitored. X       
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 17. The desired outcome is to have rule sets be completely documented and effectively 





































































A. If backups of configuration files and rule sets are 
maintained.      X  
B. If backups of configuration files and rule sets are 
NOT maintained. X       
C. If rules changes are evaluated to determine their 
security impact.       X 
D. If rules changes are NOT evaluated to determine 
their security impact. X       
E. If rules changes are fully justified and completely 
documented.       X 
F. If rules changes are NOT fully justified and 
completely documented. X       
G. If rules sets are administered by authorized 
personnel only.       X 
H. If rules sets are NOT administered strictly by 
authorized personnel. X       
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2. Node Value Survey for the Marine Corps Information Technology & 
Network Operations Center 
 The following is a survey designed to collect data on the relative values of nodal values 
within the SIAM model.  Completion of the survey should take approximately 45 minutes.  This 
survey may be completed by typing directly into this document and emailing the file back to 
mailto:cpbrodhu@nps.navy.mil; or the survey may be completed in hard copy and faxed back to 
Major Brodhun, Code 32, NPGS, at (831) 656-3681 / DSN 878-4656. 
 
COMMAND:  Marine Corps Information Technology & Network Operations Center  
 
 You will see desired outcomes listed below.  Sets of potential conditions are listed in 
tables underneath each outcome.  Place an “X” in the column to the right, which most accurately 
reflects the relative influence of each event on the desired outcome.  This survey is NOT 
concerned with the existence or non-existence of the listed conditions in a specific 
implementation.  Rather, this survey is addressing the RELATIVE TRUTH of the event. 
 
 

































































































1. The manufacturer passwords have been 
changed. 
 
       
 
X 
2. The firewall(s) is/are physically secure.         X 
3. The firewall(s) are installed by Authorized 
Personnel only. 
 



































































































4. The “direction of flow” for each allowed and 
denied service has been determined and set. 
 
      X 
 
5. A split DNS has been implemented.         X 
6. Specific services have been defined as 
“allowed.” 
 
      X 
 
7. Specific services have been defined as 
“denied.” 
 
    X   
 
8. The operating system supporting the firewall 
has been fully tested and patched (i.e., the 
OS is current). 
 
     X  
 
9. The firewall(s) are supported by a secure 
network infrastructure. 
 
      X 
 
10. The OS allows system configuration by 
users. 
 
  X     
 
11.. The OS feature set is known and well 
documented. 
 
     X  
 
12. The IP Stack configurations are protected.       X   
13. The firewall configurations allow for 
automated fail-over capabilities. 
 
      X 
 
14. The infrastructure power is clean and 
protected within Enterprise boundaries. 
 
    X   
 
15. The emergency power is available in case of 
an infrastructure failure. 
 
    X   
 
16. The firewalls are installed in pairs to 
maintain a redundant architecture. 
 
    X   
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1. The operational requirements of the 
organization (requirements levied on the 
system) have been well defined. 
 




2. The minimum throughput requirements have 
been defined. 
 
  X     
 
3. Content scanning is effectively conducted at 
the boundary layer. 
 
 X     
 
4. Mail filtering is conducted at the boundary 
layer. 
 
     X  
 
5. Packet fragments are cued, reassembled, and 
inspected at the boundary layer. 
 
  X     
 
6. Automated data logging procedures have 
been put in place. 
 
      X 
 
7. Penetration testing is periodically conducted.      X    
8. Automated intrusion detection and reporting 
is implemented at the boundary layer. 
 
      X 
 
9. Automated intrusion response has been 
implemented. 
 
  X     
 
10. Dynamic recovery and fail-over capabilities 
have been implemented.. 
 
    X   
 
11. Backups of configuration files and firewall 
rule sets are maintained. 
 



































































































12. Rules changes are evaluated to determine 
their security impact. 
 
  X     
 
13. Rules changes are fully justified and 
completely documented. 
 
    X   
 
14. Rules sets are administered by authorized 
personnel only. 
 
       
 
X 
15. Configuration criteria and standards are 
reviewed periodically. 
 
      X 
 
16. Remote access control lists are maintained 
and closely monitored. 
 
       
 
X 
17. Patches and updates are kept current.       X   
18. Trend analysis is conducted on audit and 
intrusion detection logs. 
 
    X   
 
19. Logs are incorporated into the overall audit 
architecture. 
 




APPENDIX C.     EXCURSION TWO 
The surveys in this appendix do not represent evaluations of production network systems, 
rather the collective experience and compiled opinions of the domain experts surveyed. 
 
A. JOINT INFORMATION OPERATIONS CENTER 
1. Link Value Survey 
 The following is a survey designed to collect data on the relative values of link strengths 
within the SIAM model.  Completion of the survey should take approximately 45 minutes.  This 
survey may be completed by typing directly into this document and emailing the file back to 
mailto:cpbrodhu@nps.navy.mil; or the survey may be completed in hard copy and faxed back to 
Major Brodhun, Code 32, NPGS, at (831) 656-3681 / DSN 878-4656. 
 
COMMAND:  Joint Information Operations Center 
 
 You will see desired outcomes listed below.  Sets of potential conditions are listed in 
tables underneath each outcome.  Place an “X” in the column to the right, which most accurately 
reflects the relative influence of each event on the desired outcome.  This survey is NOT 
concerned with the existence or non-existence of the listed conditions in a specific 
implementation.  Rather, this survey is addressing the RELATIVE IMPACT of the condition on 
the outcome if the condition did or did NOT exist. 
 
INSTALLATION AND CONFIGURATION: 
 
1. The desired outcome is that the firewall configuration meets common criteria and 
security standards.  What is the overall effect on the potential outcome if the following 







































































A. If the manufacturer passwords have been changed.       X 
B. If the manufacturer passwords have NOT been 
changed.  X      
C. If the firewall(s) is/are physically secure.      X  
D. If the firewall(s) is/are NOT physically secure.   X     
E. If the firewall(s) are installed by Authorized 
Personnel only.       X 
F. If the firewall(s) are NOT installed by Authorized 
Personnel.   X     
G. If the firewall rule-set has been well defined.       X 
H. If the firewall rule-set has NOT been well defined. X       
I. If the allowed and disallowed services have been 
specifically defined.      X  
J. If the allowed and disallowed services have NOT 
been specifically defined.  X      
K. If the firewall(s) are supported by a secure network 
infrastucture.       X 
L. If the firewall(s) are NOT supported by a secure 
network infrastucture. X       
M. If the firewall configurations allow for automated 
fail-over capabilities.     X   
N. If the firewall configurations DO NOT allow for 
automated fail-over capabilities.    X    
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 2. The desired outcome is to have the firewall rule set be well defined in its initial state.  





































































A. If a split DNS has been implemented.     X   
B. If a split DNS has NOT been implemented.   X     
C. If specific services have been defined as “allowed.”     X   
D. If specific services have NOT been defined as 
“allowed.”    X    
E. If specific services have been defined as “denied.”      X  
F. If specific services have NOT been defined as 
“denied.”. X       
G. If the “direction of flow” for each allowed and 
denied service has been determined and set..     X   
H. If the “direction of flow” for each allowed and 
denied service has NOT been set.  X      
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 3. The desired outcome is to have the services that are allowed and NOT allowed to pass 
through the firewall(s) to be specifically defined.  What is the effect on this outcome if 





































































A. If services have been specifically defined as 
“allowed.”     X   
B. If services have NOT been specifically defined as 
being “allowed.”    X    
C. If services have been specifically defined as 
“denied.”       X 
D. If services have NOT been specifically defined as 
“denied.”  X      
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 4. The desired outcome is to have a stable and mature operating system supporting the 





































































A. If the operating system supporting the firewall has 
been fully tested and patched (i.e., the OS is 
current).       X 
B. If the firewall operating system has NOT been fully 
vetted and patched.  X      
C. If the IP Stack configurations are protected.     X   
D. If the IP Stack configurations have NOT been 
protected.   X     
E. If the OS feature set is known and well documented.      X  
F. If the OS feature set is NOT well known.   X     
G. If the OS allows system configuration by users.     X   
H. If the OS does NOT allow system configuration by 
users.  X      
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 5. The desired outcome is to have a firewall implementation supported by a secure 





































































A. If infrastructure power is clean and protected within 
Enterprise boundaries.     X   
B. If infrastructure power is NOT clean (i.e. subject to 
spikes and brown-outs) and NOT protected within 
the enterprise.   X     
C. If emergency power is available in case of an 
infrastructure failure.     X   
D. If emergency power is NOT available in case of an 
infrastructure failure.    X    
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 6. The desired outcome is to have a firewall configuration that allows an automated fail-





































































A. If firewalls are installed in pairs to maintain a 
redundant architecture.      X  
B. If firewalls are NOT installed in pairs (thereby 
introducing a single point of failure).   X     
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 ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATIONS: 
 
7. The desired outcome is to have a firewall implementation correctly installed and 





































































A. If the firewall implementation configuration meets 
accepted common criteria and security standards.       X 
B. If the firewall implementation configuration does 
NOT meet accepted common criteria and security 
standards.  X      
C. If administrative procedures are effective.       X 
D. If administrative procedures are NOT effective. X       
E. If operational procedures are effective.       X 
F. If operational procedures are NOT effective. X       
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 8. The desired outcome is that operational procedures are effective in supporting the 
security of the firewall implementation.  What is the effect on this outcome if the 





































































A. If the operational requirements of the organization 
(requirements levied on the system) have been well 
and correctly defined.       X 
B. If the operational requirements of the organization 
(requirements levied on the system) have NOT been 
well defined.  X      
C. If procedures are in place to aid in Incident 
Recovery.      X  
D. If procedures are NOT in place to aid in Incident 
Recovery.   X     
E. If the traffic flow is closely monitored.     X   
F. If the traffic flow is NOT closely monitored.   X     
G. If the firewall is impairing network throughput.  X      
F. If the firewall is NOT impairing network 
throughput.      X  
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 9. The desired outcome is that the throughput requirements are being met.  What is the 





































































A. If the operational requirements of the organization 
(requirements levied on the system) have been well 
defined.      X  
B. If the operational requirements of the organization 
(requirements levied on the system) have NOT been 
well defined.   X     
C. If the minimum throughput requirements have been 
defined.      X  
D. If the minimum throughput requirements have NOT 
been defined.   X     
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 10. The desired outcome is that procedures are put in place to aid in Incident Recovery.  





































































A. If incident response and reporting procedures are in 
place.       X 
B. If incident response and reporting procedures are 
NOT in place. X       
C. If disaster recovery procedures are defined.       X 
D. If disaster recovery procedures are NOT defined.  X      
E. If disaster recovery procedures have been 
disseminated to authorized personnel.       X 
F. If disaster recovery procedures have NOT been 
disseminated to authorized personnel. X       
 
83 
 11. The desired outcome is that incident response and reporting procedures are in place and 





































































A. If automated intrusion detection and reporting is 
implemented at the boundary layer.       X 
B. If automated intrusion detection and reporting is 
NOT implemented at the boundary layer.  X      
C. If automated intrusion response has been 
implemented.       X 
D. If automated intrusion response has NOT been 
implemented.  X      
E. If dynamic recovery and fail-over capabilities have 
been implemented.  X      
F. If dynamic recovery and fail-over capabilities have 
NOT been implemented.      X  
G. If penetration testing is periodically conducted.     X   
H. If penetration testing is NOT periodically conducted.    X    
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 12.  The desired outcome is that disaster recovery procedures have been put in place.  What 





































































A. If dynamic recovery and fail-over capabilities have 
been implemented.       X 
B. If dynamic recovery and fail-over capabilities have 
NOT been implemented.   X     
C. If backups of configuration files and firewall rule 
sets are maintained.       X 
D. If backups of configuration files and firewall rule 
sets are NOT maintained. X       
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 13. The desired outcome is to have the system traffic flow be carefully monitored.  What is 





































































A. If the minimum throughput requirements have been 
defined.      X  
B. If the minimum throughput requirements have NOT 
been defined.   X     
C. If content scanning is effectively conducted at the 
boundary layer.      X  
D. If content scanning is NOT effectively conducted at 
the boundary layer.  X      
E. If mail filtering is conducted at the boundary layer.     X   
F. If mail filtering is NOT conducted at the boundary 
layer.    X    
G. If packet fragments are cued, reassembled, and 
inspected at the boundary layer.      X  
H. If fragmented packets are NOT cued, reassembled, 
and inspected at the boundary layer.  X      
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 14. The desired outcome is that proactive management and auditing is conducted.  What is 





































































A. If active operational management techniques are 
employed.       X 
B. If active operational management techniques are 
NOT employed. X       
C.. If rule sets are effectively documented and managed.       X 
D. If rule sets are NOT effectively documented and 
managed. X       
E.. If logs are incorporated into the overall audit 
architecture.       X 
F. If logs are NOT incorporated into the overall audit 
architecture.  X      
G.. If trend analysis is conducted on audit and intrusion 
detection logs.       X 
H. If trend analysis is NOT conducted on audit and 
intrusion detection logs.  X      
I. If patches and updates are kept current.     X   
J. If patches and updates are NOT kept current.    X    
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 15. The desired outcome is that active, operational management techniques are employed.  





































































A. If content scanning is effectively conducted at the 
boundary layer.     X   
B. If content scanning is NOT effectively conducted at 
the boundary layer.  X      
C. If mail filtering is conducted at the boundary layer.     X  X 
D. If mail filtering is NOT conducted at the boundary 
layer.    X    
E. If packet fragments are cued, reassembled, and 
inspected at the boundary layer.      X  
F. If fragmented packets are NOT cued, reassembled, 
and inspected at the boundary layer.  X      
E. If automated data logging procedures have been put 
in place.      X  
F. If automated data logging procedures have NOT 
been put in place.  X      
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 16. The desired outcome is to have procedures put in place that will support recovery from 





































































A. If backups of configuration files and rule sets are 
maintained.       X 
B. If backups of configuration files and rule sets are 
NOT maintained. X       
C. If configuration criteria and standards are reviewed 
periodically.       X 
D. If configuration criteria and standards are NOT 
reviewed periodically.  X      
E. If remote access control lists are maintained and 
closely monitored.      X  
F. If remote access control lists are NOT maintained 
and closely monitored. X       
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 17. The desired outcome is to have rule sets be completely documented and effectively 





































































A. If backups of configuration files and rule sets are 
maintained.       X 
B. If backups of configuration files and rule sets are 
NOT maintained. X       
C. If rules changes are evaluated to determine their 
security impact.       X 
D. If rules changes are NOT evaluated to determine 
their security impact. X       
E. If rules changes are fully justified and completely 
documented.      X  
F. If rules changes are NOT fully justified and 
completely documented.  X      
G. If rules sets are administered by authorized 
personnel only.      X  
H. If rules sets are NOT administered strictly by 
authorized personnel. X       
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2. Node Value Survey 
 The following is a survey designed to collect data on the relative values of nodal values 
within the SIAM model.  Completion of the survey should take approximately 45 minutes.  This 
survey may be completed by typing directly into this document and emailing the file back to 
mailto:cpbrodhu@nps.navy.mil; or the survey may be completed in hard copy and faxed back to 
Major Brodhun, Code 32, NPGS, at (831) 656-3681 / DSN 878-4656. 
 
COMMAND:  Joint Information Operations Center 
 
 You will see desired outcomes listed below.  Sets of potential conditions are listed in 
tables underneath each outcome.  Place an “X” in the column to the right, which most accurately 
reflects the relative influence of each event on the desired outcome.  This survey is NOT 
concerned with the existence or non-existence of the listed conditions in a specific 
implementation.  Rather, this survey is addressing the RELATIVE TRUTH of the event. 
 
 

































































































1. The manufacturer passwords have been 
changed. 
 
      X 
 
2. The firewall(s) is/are physically secure.       X   
3. The firewall(s) are installed by Authorized 
Personnel only. 
 
       
 
X 
4. The “direction of flow” for each allowed and 
denied service has been determined and set. 
 


































































































5. A split DNS has been implemented.        X  
6. Specific services have been defined as 
“allowed.” 
 
       
 
X 
7. Specific services have been defined as 
“denied.” 
 
       
 
X 
8. The operating system supporting the firewall 
has been fully tested and patched (i.e., the 
OS is current). 
 
      X 
 
9. The firewall(s) are supported by a secure 
network infrastructure. 
 
     X  
 
10. The OS allows system configuration by 
users. 
 
      X 
 
11.. The OS feature set is known and well 
documented. 
 
     X  
 
12. The IP Stack configurations are protected.        X  
13. The firewall configurations allow for 
automated fail-over capabilities. 
 
   X    
 
14. The infrastructure power is clean and 
protected within Enterprise boundaries. 
 
     X  
 
15. The emergency power is available in case of 
an infrastructure failure. 
 
     X  
 
16. The firewalls are installed in pairs to 
maintain a redundant architecture. 
 





































































































1. The operational requirements of the 
organization (requirements levied on the 
system) have been well defined. 
 
     X  
 
2. The minimum throughput requirements have 
been defined. 
 
   X    
 
3. Content scanning is effectively conducted at 
the boundary layer. 
 
    X   
 
4. Mail filtering is conducted at the boundary 
layer. 
 
   X    
 
5. Packet fragments are cued, reassembled, and 
inspected at the boundary layer. 
 
   X    
 
6. Automated data logging procedures have 
been put in place. 
 
     X  
 
7. Penetration testing is periodically conducted.       X   
8. Automated intrusion detection and reporting 
is implemented at the boundary layer. 
 
    X   
 
9. Automated intrusion response has been 
implemented. 
 
   X    
 
10. Dynamic recovery and fail-over capabilities 
have been implemented.. 
 
  X     
 
11. Backups of configuration files and firewall 
rule sets are maintained. 
 


































































































12. Rules changes are evaluated to determine 
their security impact. 
 
    X   
 
13. Rules changes are fully justified and 
completely documented. 
 
    X   
 
14. Rules sets are administered by authorized 
personnel only. 
 
      X 
 
15. Configuration criteria and standards are 
reviewed periodically. 
 
    X   
 
16. Remote access control lists are maintained 
and closely monitored. 
 
    X   
 
17. Patches and updates are kept current.       X   
18. Trend analysis is conducted on audit and 
intrusion detection logs. 
 
    X   
 
19. Logs are incorporated into the overall audit 
architecture. 
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